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A Twisted Fate: How California’s
Premier Environmental Law Has
Worsened the State’s Housing Crisis, and
How To Fix It
Abstract
California, the iconic Golden State, holds the infamous record for the
largest population of people experiencing homelessness in the United States.
These record-setting numbers have been steadily on the rise for decades and
are due in large part to the state’s severe housing shortage, which is currently
just under one million housing units. From those directly experiencing homelessness to those living in the country’s most expensive zip codes, the compounding economic and social impacts of the crisis touch every Californian.
The extent of the crisis is not lost on California’s leaders, but despite countless
initiatives on both the state and local levels to mitigate the shortage, no one
can seem to build housing fast enough.
One major roadblock to building more housing is the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The Act was enacted in 1970 as a pioneering
law to protect the environment from adverse developmental impacts. However, today, those opposing multifamily development have turned what was
supposed to be a legislative tool for environmental protection into a convoluted tool to oppose multifamily housing development. CEQA has long been
identified as a challenge to development, but after decades of seemingly
miniscule reforms for a substantial problem, it is time for California to shift
its perspective and seek solutions outside itself. This Comment will detail
some of California’s greatest missteps in the history of CEQA. It will then
consider what California could learn from three other states facing similar
housing shortages and how these states have reformed their own environmental laws similar to CEQA. Lastly, this Comment will encourage California to
shift its perspective on the types of development reforms that are subject to
CEQA reform by including all types of housing in future reforms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Summer 2020, construction was completed on the five-billion-dollar,
298-acre SoFi Stadium in Inglewood, California, near the heart of Los Angeles.1 Taking only four years to turn from a real estate developer’s2 dream into
a reality, the 3.1-million-square-foot stadium will serve as an epicenter for
NFL fans to cheer on their favorite football team.3 As a home to both the Los
Angeles Rams and Chargers, the stadium is expected to host at least twenty
NFL games each year.4
Only a few months after the monolithic stadium’s completion, the same
city approved the development plans for a second stadium to be located almost
directly across the street from SoFi Stadium.5 This second development, with
estimated construction costs of 1.8 billion dollars, is scheduled to begin construction in 2021 so that it can host its first Clippers NBA basketball game by
2024.6 While many Los Angeles residents are understandably excited for the
new developments, that sentiment is not shared across the board.7 Some
1. See Sam Lubell, Commentary: How SoFi Stadium Makes a Revolutionary Design Promise: A
Place for All To Play, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainmentarts/story/2020-09-02/sofi-stadium-architecture-park.
2. See Tom Hoffarth, Stan Kroenke: A Condensed Guide, L.A. BUS. J. (Mar. 16, 2020), https://labusinessjournal.com/news/2020/mar/16/business-person-year-2020-stan-kroenke-guide/.
Stan
Kroenke—the owner of the Los Angeles Rams football team—was the man with the vision for the
stadium. Id. By 2016, Kroenke already had decades of experience as a commercial real estate developer, and he is currently “one of the largest landowners in the United States.” Id.
3. See Nathan Fenno & Sam Farmer, A Turbulent Path: How Stan Kroenke and the NFL Turned
SoFi Stadium into a $5-billion Reality, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/story/2020-09-04/stan-kroenke-nfl-owners-coronavirus-workerssofi-stadium-rams-chargers; SoFi Stadium, Los Angeles Chargers and Los Angeles Rams Host Official
Ribbon-Cutting Ceremony Ahead of Inaugural Event, CHARGERS (Sept. 8, 2020, 10:17 AM),
https://www.chargers.com/news/sofi-stadium-ribbon-cutting-ceremony.
4. See Fenno & Farmer, supra note 3.
5. See Andrew Greif, Clippers Given Final Approval To Buy Land Needed for Arena in Inglewood, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/clippers/story/2020-0908/clippers-arena-given-final-approval-from-inglewood-for-land (stating that “Inglewood’s City
Council unanimously approved the sale of 13 parcels of publicly owned land to the developers of [a]
proposed arena” for the Los Angeles Clippers).
6. See id.
7. See Jonny Coleman, The Struggle Against a Stadium’s Construction Became a Battle for the
Soul of Los Angeles, THE APPEAL (Sept. 10, 2020), https://theappeal.org/sofi-stadium-gentrificationdisplacement-lennox-inglewood-tenants-union/ (explaining how the stadium’s development is impacting “residents of historically Black and Latinx neighborhoods” by pushing them “out of their
homes”); see also Bill Shaikin, Amid Super Bowl Excitement in Inglewood, Local Businesses Fear
They May Soon Be Crowded Out, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2019, 12:05 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/super-bowl/la-sp-super-bowl-inglewood-20190131-story.html
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Inglewood residents living in close proximity to the developments have expressed their concerns over issues resulting from the projects, such as gentrification and the need for the city to build more affordable housing, not another
sports stadium.8 Despite these concerns and the ardent refusal of some private
landowners to sell their property, Inglewood’s City Council has done their
best to successfully mute the local residents’ critiques and fast-track the project’s approvals.9
Meanwhile, within only a few miles of the Inglewood developments,
there is a very different development story being written relating to affordable
housing.10 Unlike the large stadiums, the relatively miniscule affordable
housing projects in Los Angeles have run into seemingly insurmountable
roadblocks.11 All these roadblocks exist despite the fact that Los Angeles desperately needs more housing stock—arguably much more than it needs new
stadiums.12 To address the financial roadblock of increasing housing stock,
Los Angeles residents voted in 2016 to pass Proposition HHH, which set aside
1.2 billion dollars for “the development of up to 10,000 [new] supportive
housing units for individuals and families experiencing homelessness.”13
In passing HHH, Los Angeles thought that it had cleared one of the
(discussing local residents’ concerns that the new stadiums could crowd older businesses out of the
area); Homes Before Arenas, UPLIFT INGLEWOOD COAL., https://www.upliftinglewood.org/homesbeforearenas (expressing the feeling among some Inglewood residents that the city needs to address its
issues of housing affordability before building new stadiums) (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).
8. See Coleman, supra note 7.
9. See Jason Henry, Inglewood Will Use Eminent Domain To Acquire Land Needed for Clippers’
Arena, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (JAN. 25, 2021, 12:50 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2021/01/25/inglewood-will-use-eminent-domain-to-acquire-land-needed-for-la-clippers-arena/ (stating that “Inglewood plans to use eminent domain to secure 11 properties needed for the proposed Los Angeles Clippers basketball arena project”); see also Brittany Martin, Inglewood Expected To Use Eminent Domain
To Clear Way for Clippers Arena, L.A. MAG. (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/eminent-domain-inglewood-clippers/ (describing some Inglewood residents’ hesitancy towards
the new stadium given the other seemingly more pertinent needs of the city, like low-income housing).
10. See infra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
11. See Doug Smith, This L.A. Project Shows that Homeless Housing Can Be Done Quickly and
Cheaply, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2021-01-18/los-angeles-homeless-housing-project-vignes-street (detailing that one recently
erected homeless housing building in Los Angeles costs $48 million and provides 232 beds).
12. See Noah Buhayar & Christopher Cannon, How California Became America’s Housing Market
Nightmare, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2019-california-housing-crisis/ (detailing Los Angeles’s housing shortage).
13. The High Cost of Homeless Housing: Review of Proposition HHH, L.A. OFF. OF THE
CONTROLLER (Oct. 8, 2019), https://lacontroller.org/audits-and-reports/high-cost-of-homeless-housing-hhh/.
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greatest burdens to its housing crisis—funding and public support.14 However, almost immediately after development efforts began, more roadblocks
emerged.15 These remaining roadblocks effectively muted the excitement
from HHH’s passage: in 2020, almost four years after the landmark housing
bill, only one single housing complex had opened, consisting of just sixty-two
units.16 In fact, the city now projects that instead of reaching its initial 10,000
housing unit goal, Los Angeles will barely reach half that amount.17 The major barrier that affordable housing proponents now face is the political opposition of angry, development-reticent citizens who are effectively stalling
what could have been a turning point in the history of Los Angeles.18 And
unlike the case of the two Inglewood stadiums, local politicians have yet to
intervene in any meaningful way to mute the affordable housing critics and
speed up the projects.19
While the above example focuses on only one city, Los Angeles effectively serves as a microcosm of what is happening across the state of California, where most, if not all, of the state’s urban regions face similar housing
development challenges.20 Many of these large cities continue to fast-track
14. See Jason McGahan, Will a Measure To Help L.A.’s Homeless Become a Historic Public Housing Debacle?, L.A. MAG. (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.lamag.com/citythinkblog/proposition-hhh-debacle/. Since HHH is a tax increase on the general population, it required “a two-thirds supermajority
to pass.” Id. At the time of HHH’s passing, Los Angeles City Council President Herb Wesson called
HHH potentially “the most important thing that all of us do in our lives.” Id.
15. See id. (epitomizing the stagnation that followed the passage of Proposition HHH: “Not a single HHH [homeless housing] unit was completed by the end of 2018”).
16. Sandhya Kambhampati, Swetha Kannan & Iris Lee, What Happened to L.A.’s $1 Billion for
Homeless Housing, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/projects/la-homeless-housing-hhh-tracker/; see Dough Smith, It Took Three Years of Blown Deadlines, but L.A. Opens Its First
Homeless Housing Project, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-07/homeless-housing-project-proposition-hhh-bond-measure.
17. See Smith, supra note 16.
18. See TIMES ED. BD., Editorial: Don’t Let NIMBYs—Or Weak-Kneed Politicians—Stand in the
Way of Homeless Housing, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2018, 4:15 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-permanent-supportive-housing-homeless-project-20180227-htmlstory.html [hereinafter Don’t Let NIMBYs]; see also infra notes 138–42 and accompanying text (explaining the term
NIMBY in further detail).
19. Compare supra note 9 and accompanying text (showing that Inglewood’s City Council has
taken steps to ensure quick approval of the stadium projects by “muting” the critiques of local residents), with Don’t Let NIMBYs, supra note 18 (stating that City Council members in Los Angeles
“have been extremely reluctant over the years to challenge the fierce opposition of their most vocal
constituents on the issue of homelessness”).
20. See, e.g., Adam Brinklow, Housing Shortages and NIMBYism Driving Homeless Crisis, Says
New
Report,
CURBED
S.F.
(Apr.
11,
2019,
9:43
AM),
https://sf.curbed.com/2019/4/11/18306180/homeless-affordable-housing-shortage-nimby-bay-area-
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multi-billion-dollar projects, such as sports stadiums, all while public opposition from a vocal minority successfully derails any efforts to build more of
what is desperately needed—affordable housing.21 This issue persists despite
the fact that California faces one of the largest housing shortages in the country22—recent studies estimate that California’s housing deficit is around
820,000 units.23 So far, any hope for a brighter horizon appears bleak, especially if Los Angeles’s efforts through HHH serve as a case study of what
occurs in other California cities.24
The failures from Proposition HHH have helped expose the reality that
solving the issue of funding is not the end-all solution to building more housing.25 Rather, a more subversive roadblock exists, preventing California from
making sufficient headway in the area of housing development.26 This roadblock lies at the heart of California’s premier environmental law: the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).27 Generally speaking, “CEQA provides a process through which public agencies, the public, and project
developers can evaluate a project, understand its environmental impacts, and
develop measures to reduce these impacts.”28 However, over the past few
decades, those opposing new multifamily developments have turned what was
supposed to be a tool for environmental regulation into one that prevents
economic-institute (“Homelessness across the nine Bay Area counties is getting worse not only due to
a dearth of development[] but because most counties neglect affordable housing while allowing
NIMBY interests to scare off potential solutions.”); Joseph Perkins, NIMBYs, No-Growthers Worsen
Housing Crunch, ORANGE CTY. REG. (May 15, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2015/05/15/nimbys-no-growthers-worsen-housing-crunch/ (detailing how NIMBY opposition harms the housing market in Orange County).
21. See infra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining how California has traditionally found a
way to grant CEQA exemptions for the construction of sports stadiums but not for the erection of
affordable housing units).
22. See Chase Stone, Easements, Exchanges, and Equity: Models for California’s Climate and
Housing Crisis, 26 HASTINGS ENV’T. L.J. 289, 296 (2020) (finding that “[a]bout one-fourth of the
United States’ homeless population lives in California”).
23. See FREDDIE MAC, THE HOUSING SUPPLY SHORTAGE: STATE OF THE STATES 1–7 (2020),
http://www.freddiemac.com/fmac-resources/research/pdf/202002-Insight-12.pdf [hereinafter THE
HOUSING SUPPLY SHORTAGE] (providing details surrounding California’s housing shortage and comparing it to that of other states).
24. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text.
25. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
26. See discussion infra Section II.D.
27. See discussion infra Section II.B.
28. CEQA
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
PLAN. & CONSERVATION LEAGUE,
https://www.pcl.org/campaigns/ceqa/ceqa-faqs/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).
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California from ever building the requisite housing stock.29 When holistically
considered, the use of CEQA as an anti-development tool serves to harm the
environment, not help it.30 This Comment highlights these issues and proposes four main legislative changes to CEQA that will remove it as a barrier
to development and hopefully allow California to get back on track to meet
its housing needs.31
Part II of this Comment details the historical background that laid the
groundwork for the modern CEQA law and provides a broad overview of
CEQA and how the law operationally fulfills its purpose.32 Part II also discusses some of the ways in which CEQA has become a tool for developmentreticent community members to impede the development of multifamily housing projects.33 Part III analyzes various recent CEQA reform efforts.34 It discusses why some of the proposed reforms fail to get through the legislature
and how even some of the enacted reforms are often so critically flawed that
they fail to make meaningful changes.35 In light of these legislative failures,
Part III also looks to how California courts have prevented local municipalities from enacting such meaningful CEQA reform themselves.36 Part IV then
29. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
30. See infra note 153 and accompanying text (highlighting how CEQA is now used to harm the
environment); infra notes 55–58 and accompanying text (describing the original legislative intent of
CEQA).
31. See discussion infra Parts II, III, IV (stating general issues with CEQA and proposing potential
solutions). Given that CEQA is fundamentally positioned near the center of California’s polarizing
housing policy discussions, to date many scholars have shared their critiques and proposed reforms to
CEQA. See, e.g., Sean Stuart Varner, The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) After Two
Decades: Relevant Problems and Ideas for Necessary Reform, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1447 (1992) (providing legislative history on the enaction of CEQA and detailing the reform efforts in the Act’s first
twenty years of existence); Annelise Bertrand, Proxy War: The Role of Recent CEQA Exemptions in
Fixing California’s Housing Crisis, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 413 (2020) (critiquing three recent
reforms to CEQA through Senate Bill 35, Assembly Bill 73, and Senate Bill 540 and discussing part
of the problem with prevailing wage requirements); Jennifer Hernandez, California Environmental
Quality Act Lawsuits and California’s Housing Crisis, 24 HASTINGS ENV’T L.J. 21 (2018) (highlighting the barriers that CEQA creates for developers and how some of its current uses are antithetical to
helping the environment). This Comment employs much of this past work as a foundation to frame
the broad issues surrounding CEQA and to highlight the impasse that legislators have appeared to
reach on the issue. See infra Part III. Then, this Comment picks up where much of the prior work has
left off by analyzing three other states that have reformed their CEQA-equivalent statutes and bringing
economic real estate research to bear on future policy decisions. See infra Part IV.
32. See discussion infra Part II.
33. See infra Section II.D.1.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See discussion infra Sections III.A, III.B, III.C.
36. See infra Section III.D.
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looks to three states with little-NEPA laws that are also facing housing shortages—Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New York—and suggests how California could learn from these states’ little-NEPA reform efforts.37 This Part further suggests that California must shift its perspective on the types of
developments that are impacted by CEQA reforms by including all forms of
multifamily housing in its reforms, including mid- to high-income housing.38
Part V concludes.39
II. BACKGROUND
A. Reviving the Economy, Inadvertently Killing the Earth.
“Clean air, clean water, open spaces—these should once again be the
birthright of every American.”
—Richard Nixon40
To fully understand CEQA and its implications, it is necessary to consider
the historical events leading up to its legislative enactment.41 In 1932, the
United States was in the midst of one of its darkest moments—the Great Depression.42 At its bleakest, about fifteen million people were unemployed during the Depression, representing more than 20% of the United States population.43 Hoping to guide the economy out of its dire straits, President Roosevelt
implemented the Works Progress Administration (WPA).44 At its core, the
WPA’s purpose was to provide each unemployed individual with a job, and
37. See discussion infra Section IV.A.
38. See infra Section IV.B.
39. See infra Part V.
40. Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, State of the Union Address (Jan.
22, 1970).
41. See infra notes 42–60 and accompanying text.
42. See Christina D. Romer & Richard H. Pells, Great Depression: Causes of the Decline,
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Great-Depression/Causes-of-the-decline (Nov. 30,
2020).
43. Great Depression History, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/great-depression/greatdepression-history (last visited Nov. 5, 2021). This period of time accounted for the highest unemployment rate that the United States has ever experienced. See Kimberly Amadeo, Unemployment
Rate by Year Since 1929 Compared to Inflation and GDP, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/unemployment-rate-by-year-3305506 (Mar. 16, 2020).
44. Works Progress Administration, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Works-Progress-Administration (July 7, 2020).
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the program served its purpose so well that by 1943 it was no longer needed.45
In total, WPA projects “produced more than 650,000 miles . . . of roads;
125,000 public buildings; 75,000 bridges; 8,000 parks; and 800 airports.”46
While the WPA officially ended in 1943, its ideals continued to influence
the creation of future massive public projects.47 As the United States stepped
into the 1960s and the dust began to settle from the excitement of the WPA,
many began to wonder what kind of toll such an aggressive development posture was taking on the environment.48 In response to this mounting public
environmental concern, “[o]n January 1, 1970, President Nixon signed the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)” into law.49 The first of its kind,
NEPA is referred to as the federal environmental law “Magna Carta”50 and
sought to “revers[e] a national environmental decline,” which ironically was
“caused in disproportionate amount by the federal government itself.”51
NEPA requires that, prior to a federal agency commencing a project that may
have a “significant effect on the ‘quality of the human environment,’” the acting government agency must file a comprehensive environmental assessment.52 The project can then only move forward if it is fully compliant with

45. See id. (stating that by 1943 unemployment was “virtual[ly] eliminat[ed] . . . by a wartime
economy,” and “the WPA was terminated”).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Lee Lacy, Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Birth of the Interstate Highway System,
U.S.
ARMY
(Feb.
20,
2018),
https://www.army.mil/article/198095/dwight_d_eisenhower_and_the_birth_of_the_interstate_highway_system (explaining that, between 1956 and the
early 1990s, the federal government funded the construction of “nearly 45,000 miles of interstate highway”); U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, THE HISTORY OF LARGE FEDERAL DAMS: PLANNING, DESIGN,
AND CONSTRUCTION IN THE ERA OF BIG DAMS 183, 280, 347, 463, 305 (2005),
https://www.usbr.gov/history/HistoryofLargeDams/LargeFederalDams.pdf (listing numerous dams
that were built by the federal government in the 1950s and 1960s, including the Garrison, Glen Canyon, Shasta, and Oroville Dams).
48. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 47, at 399–403 (explaining how the tone began
to change in the 1960s as people began to wonder what the environmental risks were of building such
massive dams); see also Varner, supra note 31, at 1448 (stating that by 1970 there was “growing
concerns for protecting the environment”).
49. Varner, supra note 31, at 1448; see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 4371–4374 (West) (providing the statutory language of NEPA).
50. Welcome, NEPA.GOV, https://ceq.doe.gov/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2021). The 1970s are considered “environmental law’s formal commencement,” as over fifteen important environment-related
laws were passed, beginning with NEPA. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 48, 70 (2004).
51. Michael C. Blumm, The National Environmental Policy Act at Twenty: A Preface, 20 ENV’T
L. 447, 448 (1990).
52. Varner, supra note 31, at 1450 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)).
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NEPA’s guidelines.53
In the years following NEPA’s enactment, state legislators in sixteen
states recognized the need for their own state-specific versions of NEPA, and
thus, enacted their own “little NEPAs.”54 Perhaps the strictest of all little
NEPAs is the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).55 Enacted only
eight months after NEPA by California Governor Ronald Reagan, CEQA “require[d] state and local agencies to identify the significant environmental impacts of their actions and to avoid or mitigate those impacts, if feasible.”56
Unlike NEPA, which focuses solely on the projects enacted by federal agencies that could have significant environmental effects,57 CEQA goes a step
further and enforces environmental regulations on “private individuals, corporations, and public agencies” so long as their actions could “affect the quality of the environment.”58 The oversight of projects triggering CEQA enforcement is carried out by a local lead governmental agency, who determines first
if “the proposed activity is subject to CEQA at all,” then “[s]econd . . . whether
the activity qualifies for one of the many [CEQA] exemptions.”59 If no
53. Varner, supra note 31, at 1450.
54. See States and Local Jurisdictions with NEPA-like Environmental Planning Requirements,
NEPA.GOV, https://ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/states.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2021) (showing that
the states that have created their own “environmental review requirements” are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin; Washington D.C. and
Puerto Rico have similar requirements); see also First Annual “Little NEPA” Conference: State-Level
Environmental Impact Assessment, ENV’T L. INST. (April 2005), https://www.eli.org/news/first-annual-little-nepa-conference-state-level-environmental-impact-assessment (noting that state “programs
for preparing environmental impact assessments of proposed governmental and private actions” are
“often called ‘little NEPAs’”).
55. See Bertrand, supra note 31, at 413 (asserting that CEQA “is one of the strongest state-level
environmental statutes in the United States”).
56. Frequently Asked Questions About CEQA, CA NAT. RES. AGENCY, http://files.resources.ca.gov/ceqa/more/faq.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
57. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 1979); see also Application for Leave To File Amicus
Curiae Brief of Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n in Support of Defendants and Respondents Stanislaus Cnty. at
17–18, Protecting Our Water & Env’t Res. v. City of Stanislaus, 472 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2020) (No.
S251709) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondents] (“California’s land use and environmental review process is quite different than in other states—not necessarily because of anything in CEQA
itself, but rather because of the choices local agencies in California may make about how to design
their own permitting processes.”).
59. Union of Med. Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 446 P.3d 317, 323 (Cal. 2019).
For the sake of efficiency, this Comment does not fully cover the detailed “three-tiered decision tree.”
See id. at 323–25 (providing a full explanation of the CEQA “three-tiered decision tree”).
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exemption applies, then “environmental review . . . must [be] undertake[n].”60
B. The Strictest of the “Little NEPAs”—CEQA
Generally speaking, local agencies split projects into two CEQA-defined
subcategories when determining whether a project is subject to CEQA review—ministerial and discretionary.61 The word “discretionary” is commonly referred to as the gateway to CEQA since CEQA applies to nearly all
discretionary projects.62 Discretionary projects are those requiring the approval of a public agency prior to commencement, such as “enactment and
amendment of zoning ordinances, the issuance of zoning variances, the issuance of conditional use permits, and the approval of tentative subdivision
maps.”63 If there exists even a fair argument that the project could negatively
impact the environment,64 the developer must complete an Environmental Impact Report (EIR)—known as the “heart of CEQA.”65 The EIR is an extensive
document prepared by the developer and then analyzed by the public agency
that provides decision-makers “with information they can use in deciding

60. Id. at 323.
61. When Does CEQA Apply?, OFF. OF HISTORIC PRES., https://ohp.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=21723
(last visited Sept. 19, 2021).
62. See LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, DISCRETION–THE GATEWAY TO & LIMITATION ON CEQA 2
(2019), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Member-Engagement/Professional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Library/2019/2019-Annual-Conference/10-2019-AC;-Velyvis-Discretion-TheGateway-To-And.aspx; CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West 2014).
63. § 21080(a); see LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 62, at 6 (providing a simple elementdriven approach to whether a project is considered discretionary). A project is subject to CEQA review
if it (1) “involves an activity that may cause a direct (or reasonably foreseeable indirect) physical
change in the environment” and (2) “is an activity that will either be directly undertaken by a public
agency, supported in whole or in part by a public agency, or involves the issuance by a public agency
of some form of entitlement, permit, or other authorization.” LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 62,
at 6. In Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, the California Supreme Court clarified that
discretionary developments include all those that require permits or conditions that extend outside of
present local zoning codes. 235 Cal. Rptr. 788, 795 (Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
64. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 529 P.2d 66, 71 (Cal. 1974). In No Oil, the California
Supreme Court clearly noted that it intentionally chose a low threshold to trigger an EIR, instead of
only requiring EIRs for “projects which may have an ‘important’ or ‘monumentous’” environmental
impact. Id. at 70. In Ocean View Estates Homeowners Ass’n v. Montecito Water District, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District noted that the reason the threshold is so low is partly
due to the finality of the negative declaration to end the environmental review. 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 451,
453 (Dist. Ct. App. 2004). If the threshold is not cleared, then the developer need not file an EIR. Id.
Instead, they will just file a negative declaration, and the procedure is done. Id.
65. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1990).
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whether to approve a proposed project.”66 Included within the pages of an
EIR are statements of a project’s environmental impact, as well as evaluations
of what could be done to mitigate such impacts and how project alternatives
could avoid the impacts altogether.67 These reports are costly for developers,
and in Schellinger Brothers v. City of Sebastopol, the judge noted that “[i]t is
probably a truism that since adoption of [CEQA] in 1970, every developer has
at some point before construction start[ed] ground his teeth or clenched her
fists in frustration while enduring the often lengthy process leading to certification of an [EIR] for the proposed project.”68
On the other hand, ministerial projects are not subject to CEQA review.69
Ministerial projects are those already conforming to the existing land use
standard and therefore “require[] little or no personal judgment by a public
official as to the wisdom or manner of carrying out the project.”70 Due to its
objective inquiry on fixed standards, the California Supreme Court has reasoned that requiring environmental reports, such as EIRs, for ministerial projects “would be a meaningless exercise.”71
Even if a project might be classified as discretionary, however, the project
could be exempt from any of the CEQA protocols so long as it fits within a
statutory72 or categorical exemption.73 While most CEQA statutory exemptions are only given for specific projects, such as “repairs to public service
facilities of an emergency nature,” the California legislature has a growing
66. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass’n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 764 P.2d 278, 284 (Cal. 1988);
see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21100 (West 1994) (detailing the required aspects of an EIR). The EIR
has also been referred to “as an environmental ‘alarm bell’ whose purpose it is to alert the public and
its responsible officials to environmental changes before they have reached ecological points of no
return.” Cnty. of Inyo v. Yorty, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 388 (Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
67. GOV’T OFF. PLAN. & RSCH., CEQA: DESIGNING HEALTHY, EQUITABLE, RESILIENT, AND
ECONOMICALLY VIBRANT PLACES 271 (2020), https://opr.ca.gov/docs/OPR_C10_final.pdf.
68. 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 395 (Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (internal citations omitted).
69. See When does CEQA Apply?, supra note 61.
70. Id. (showing common examples of ministerial projects, such as “roof replacements, interior
alterations to residences, and landscaping changes”); see Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los
Angeles, 235 Cal. Rptr. 788, 796 (Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that the only way that a development
project will be considered “presumptively ministerial” is if “the agency has no power to exercise . . .
personal judgment . . . but instead only has the power to determine whether zoning allows the structure
to be built and whether it satisfies strength requirements, and nothing more”).
71. Mountain Lion Found. v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 939 P.2d 1280, 1287 (Cal. 1997).
72. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15260–15285 (2005). These are CEQA exemptions “granted
by the legislature.” § 15260.
73. See §§ 15300–15333. These exemptions are limited to “projects which have been determined
not to have a significant effect on the environment.” § 15300.
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track record of granting exemptions for private projects such as sports stadiums.74 For certain billion-dollar, highly profitable development projects like
sports arenas, fortune-500 office headquarters,75 or preparations for the Olympic games,76 the developer often has enough political weight and financial
means to leverage a statutory exemption.77 But since most developers do not
have the same level of influence or available capital as billionaire-sportsteam-owners, this option remains elusive to most developers.78
C. Charting Its Own Path: CEQA’s Unique Feature from NEPA—Judicial
Interpretation
While CEQA was initially designed in relation to its federal counterpart,
NEPA, there are significant differences between the two statutes.79 One
unique feature of CEQA is that unlike NEPA, which provides little room for
judicial interpretation, California state courts play a pivotal role in the interpretation and implementation of CEQA.80 It is possible that California courts
74. Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano Cnty. Airport Land Use Comm’n, 160 P. 3d 116, 120 (Cal. 2007);
see also Kristen Kortick, Oakland A’s on Deck with CEQA Exemption Legislation for New Stadium,
ABBOTT & KINDERMANN, INC. (July 30, 2018), https://blog.aklandlaw.com/2018/07/articles/ceqa/oakland-deck-ceqa-exemption-legislation-new-stadium/ (providing a list of sports stadiums
to receive recent full CEQA exemptions: the Los Angeles Rams, Sacramento Kings, Golden State
Warriors, and the Los Angeles Clippers). Courts have upheld these sorts of project-specific statutory
exemptions against claims of unconstitutionality. See, e.g., Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento, 180 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 342, 355 (Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the accelerated, projectspecific CEQA deadlines imposed by a state statute were in violation of the California Constitution).
75. See Liam Dillon, Which California Megaprojects Get Breaks from Complying with Environmental Law? Sometimes, It Depends on the Project, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017, 11:15 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-enviromental-law-breaks-20170925-story.html. For example, the social media giant Facebook was recently granted a fast-tracking CEQA exemption so it
could build its new headquarters in Menlo Park, California. See id.
76. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15272 (2005) (detailing CEQA exemptions for developments
relating to the 2028 Summer Olympics, set to be held in Los Angeles, California).
77. See Kortick, supra note 74.
78. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 80–92 and accompanying text.
80. See Varner, supra note 31, at 1450 (stating that “[u]nlike the federal courts in NEPA decisions,
state courts [under CEQA] have embraced environmental policies by promoting judicial interpretation”). The California Supreme Court had “the first opportunity to construe provisions of [CEQA]”
in relation to the legislature’s intent in a 1972 case, Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors. 502
P.2d 1049, 1051–52 (Cal. 1972). In Friends of Mammoth, the California Supreme Court established
the “fair argument” test, which created a very low threshold for plaintiffs to be able to bring their
CEQA impact claims. See Christopher Chou, Fair Argument Test Applies to Agency Determination
Whether Subsequent CEQA Review Is Required once a Negative Declaration Has Been Adopted,
PERKINS COIE (June 1, 2017), https://www.californialandusedevelopmentlaw.com/2017/06/01/fair-
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first took up the mantle as CEQA’s primary interpreter due to CEQA’s “theoretical and vague application[]” of many important statutory terms.81 In the
words of one scholar, “in contrast to NEPA, the [CEQA] state statute delineates a viable policy[] but fails to procedurally institute its policy goals.”82
In interpreting public agency decisions, California courts have repeatedly
stated that they will “scrupulously enforc[e] all legislatively mandated CEQA
requirements.”83 Over the past decades, this room for judicial review has led
to an increasingly broad interpretation of what constitutes a discretionary project as compared to what was explicitly stated in CEQA’s initial

argument-test-applies-to-agency-determination-whether-subsequent-ceqa-review-is-required-once-anegative-declaration-has-been-adopted/ (discussing “the [California] Supreme Court’s ruling that the
question of whether further environmental review is required for modifications to a project approved
based on a negative declaration is not subject to the deferential substantial evidence test but is instead
governed by the more searching ‘fair argument’ standard”).
81. Varner, supra note 31, at 1453.
82. Id. One example of how CEQA’s vague statutory language has led to expansive interpretations
by the California courts is regarding what sort of projects trigger the CEQA review process. See Union
of Med. Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 446 P.3d 317, 332 (Cal. 2019). Recently, the
California Supreme Court reminded local agencies of CEQA’s expansive ambiguity by stating that:
[A] proposed activity is a CEQA project if, by its general nature, the activity is
capable of causing a direct or reasonably foreseeable indirect physical change
in the environment. This determination is made without considering whether,
under the specific circumstances in which the proposed activity will be carried
out, these potential effects will actually occur.
Id.; see also LISABETH D. ROTHMAN, CEQA TURNS FORTY: THE MORE THINGS CHANGE, THE MORE
THEY REMAIN THE SAME 3–7 (2011), https://law.ucdavis.edu/centers/environmental/files/Rothmanarticle-Hernandez.pdf (discussing how California courts have dealt with CEQA’s statutory ambiguity
when it comes to terms like “projects” and “feasibility”). But see S.F. Taxi Coal. v. City of San Francisco, 979 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that a project will not be found to be present
under CEQA if the connection between the proposed activity and the environmental impact “is so
attenuated as to be ‘speculative’” (quoting Union of Med. Marijuana Patients, Inc., 446 P.3d at 332)).
In contrast, federal courts have strictly construed NEPA’s statutory language, resulting in a clearer
application of the law. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.20 (1976) (finding that NEPA
“does not require an agency to consider the possible environmental impacts of less imminent actions
when preparing the impact statement on proposed actions”). Under NEPA’s statutory language, federal agencies must “prepare a detailed Environmental Impact Statement . . . for ‘major [f]ederal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.’” Paul J. Cucuzzella, The Mute Swan
Case, the Fund for Animals, et al. v. Norman, et al.: National, Regional and Local Environmental
Policy Rendered Irrelevant by Animal Rights Activists, 11 U. BALT. J. ENV’T L. 101, 108 (2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)). The court in Kleppe went on to say that “[a] court has no authority to
depart from the statutory language.” Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 406.
83. Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach, 392 P.3d 455, 466 (Cal. 2017) (quoting Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Bd. of Supervisors, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Cal. 1990)).
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codification.84 This judicial interpretation has allowed CEQA review to play
a major role even on minor projects like a single-family home just because the
project might impact someone’s private view or temporarily cause increased
construction noise.85 One recent example was in Canyon Crest Conservancy
v. County of Los Angeles,86 where a private citizen used the threat of an impending CEQA suit (and all the intensive reporting that comes along with it)
to scare a private individual away from building a single-family house on a
one-acre parcel.87
Furthermore, due to the impact of stare decisis, CEQA’s past judicial interpretations are often followed in subsequent CEQA cases, even if a different
judge considering the circumstances might have interpreted the matter differently.88 This precedent has effectively lowered the bar for CEQA-related
claims by validating even minor environmental impacts such as temporary
noise pollution,89 opinions of aesthetic impairment, and more.90 This is why,
when looking at CEQA’s history, one must analyze both the legislative
84. See Hernandez, supra note 31; see also S.B. 55, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (“Rigorous
judicial enforcement of CEQA has made the law stronger and more effective.”).
85. See Hernandez, supra note 31, at 40 (stating that “‘impacts’ to th[e] existing environment—
ranging from temporary construction noise, to changes in private views, to increases in the number of
kids playing in the park, going to school or using a library—are all required to be avoided or reduced
to a ‘less than significant level,’ to ‘the extent feasible given the objectives of the project’”) (quoting
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 1513(a)(2)); see also Pocket Protectors v. City of Sacramento, 21 Cal. Rptr.
3d. 791 (Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 187 Cal. Rptr. 3d
96 (Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
86. 259 Cal. Rptr. 3d 368 (Dist. Ct. App. 2020).
87. Id. at 371–74; see Ridiculous CEQA Challenge To Development of 1,436 Square Foot Residence on 1.04-acre Parcel Did Not Vindicate Important Right for Purpose of Awarding Attorney Fees,
MITCHELL CHADWICK (Apr. 4, 2020), http://www.mitchellchadwick.com/2020/04/ridiculous-ceqachallenge-to-development-of-1436-square-foot-residence-on-1-04-acre-parcel-did-not-vindicate-important-right-for-purpose-of-awarding-attorney-fees/ (providing a short analysis of Canyon Crest).
88. See Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Loc. Agency Formation Comm’n, 981 P.2d 543, 552–53 (Cal.
1999) (outlining the impact that the principle of stare decisis has on court decisions in subsequent
cases).
89. See, e.g., Citizens for Responsible & Open Gov’t v. City of Grand Terrace, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d
202, 205 (Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding, in favor of the plaintiff, that the increased ambient noise of
air conditioning units from a “120-unit senior housing facility” was a sufficient environmental impact
to require an environmental impact report and awarding plaintiff attorneys’ fees).
90. See Ocean View Ests. Homeowners Ass’n v. Montecito Water Dist., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 451,
455–56 (Dist. Ct. App. 2004). In Ocean View, the local water district tried to put a metal cover over
a water reservoir to “prevent water quality problems.” Id. at 453. However, local residents objected
to the cover on the basis that the cover would cause a significant environmental impact by obstructing
their view from a few select homes and from local hiking trails. Id. at 455–56. The court found in
favor of the plaintiffs and said that the citizens’ opinions of the potential obstruction was sufficient.
Id.
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enactments and the subsequent judicial interpretations that serve to color in
between the lines of the explicit statutory text.91 Historically, this web of
broadened CEQA applications has served as a pathway for subsequent lawsuits.92
In interpreting what serves as a discretionary project, both public agencies
and courts have historically based their determinations on the delicate balance
of policy interests, “including [the] economic, environmental, and social factors” of a project.93 The California Supreme Court highlighted the importance
of this balancing test in Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors
when it noted that environmental regulatory tools such as CEQA “must not be
subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic,
or recreational development and advancement.”94 This statement aligns with
one of CEQA’s original, clearly stated purposes, which is to “provid[e] a decent home and satisfying living environment for every Californian.”95
Reviewing CEQA’s direct application over the last half-century, however, it appears that California public agencies and the judiciary have continued to stray further and further from giving sufficient weight to the balancing
test’s economic and social factors.96 As a result, the scale has disproportionately tipped in favor of environmental protection at the expense of providing
91. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
92. Compare Friends of Westwood, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 235 Cal. Rptr. 788, 797 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1987) (holding that the issuance of a building permit for a major construction project was discretionary in a CEQA suit that was more within the bounds of what the legislature intended when
CEQA was first enacted), and Miller v. City of Hermosa Beach, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 408 (Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that issuing a hotel permit was a discretionary project), with Kenneth R. Weiss, Reports
Have an Impact on Environment: Development: Studies Mandated by the State Are Poised To Play a
Key Role in the Biggest Decisions Facing Local Officials, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 15, 1991),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-09-15-me-3409-story.html (explaining how, in 1991,
community members launched a CEQA suit against a developer’s efforts to build a land fill because
they were concerned that “sea gulls might spread the [AIDs] virus by carrying used condoms from the
dump to nearby neighborhoods”).
93. City of Irvine v. Cnty. of Orange, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586, 592 (Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15021(d) (2005) (stating a public agency’s duty to balance various policy
interests); Bozung v. Loc. Agency Formation Comm’n, 529 P.2d 1017, 1030 (Cal. 1975) (stating that
there is no guarantee that CEQA determinations will “always be those which favor environmental
considerations,” but it will be determined neutrally).
94. 801 P.2d 1161, 1175 (Cal. 1990); see also Bozung, 529 P.2d at 1030 (“The purpose of CEQA
is not to generate paper but to compel government at all levels to make decisions with environmental
consequences in mind.”).
95. City of Irvine, 164 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 592 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
96. See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.
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a suitable home for the over one-hundred thousand Californians dealing with
housing insecurity.97 This is demonstrated by a 2015 report by Holland and
Knight, which explained that the most frequent use of CEQA today is targeted
towards residential projects, particularly high-density apartment projects in
urban areas, and not the sort of open-space environmental areas that one might
imagine.98
D. The Dark Side of CEQA
“I have been on the receiving end of abuses by CEQA. I have literally
been threatened by CEQA. I have seen abuses for non-environmental reasons.”
–California Governor Gavin Newsom99
Together, the California judiciary and legislature have strengthened
CEQA’s influence by empowering local development-reticent municipalities
and by commissioning individual citizens and citizen groups opposed to certain development projects.100 This has ultimately weakened any private developer’s ability to navigate CEQA issues in a cost-effective manner.101
1. Enabling Municipalities To Abuse CEQA
Even though the official delegation of local municipalities’ zoning power
preceded CEQA’s enactment by almost fifty years, it has always been a major
character in CEQA’s storyline.102 This is because, as a result of a
97. See infra Section II.D. It is worth pointing out early on that, while this Comment seeks to
critique the unintended negative aspects of CEQA, it does not ignore the important role that CEQA
continues to play in providing the average citizen with a voice in the environmental change of their
own community. See California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) Review, CAL. DEP’T FISH &
WILDLIFE, https://wildlife.ca.gov/Conservation/CEQA/Purpose (last visited Sept. 29, 2021). Recognizing the inherent value in the CEQA tool, this Comment does not advocate for complete repeal of
CEQA but instead for comprehensive CEQA reform to certain aspects that have become harmful to
California’s future of sustainable development. See infra Parts III, IV.
98. See JENNIFER HERNANDEZ & DAVID FRIEDMAN, IN THE NAME OF THE ENVIRONMENT 62–63
(2015).
99. “PG&E No Longer Exists. It Will Be Completely Transformed.” Six Quotes from Gov. Newsom, FRESNO BEE, https://www.fresnobee.com/opinion/editorials/article237326924.html (last visited
Feb. 1, 2020).
100. See infra Sections II.D.1, II.D.2, II.D.3.
101. See infra notes 127–37 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
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municipality’s local control over its zoning power, municipalities are able to
use this self-regulated control as a “crucial regulatory lever” to exercise local
power over state-wide efforts such as CEQA.103 This local power was established in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.104 and has since been stretched
to great lengths to the deferential advantage of municipalities.105 This power
impacts CEQA because if a municipality desires, it can place a blanket discretionary approval requirement on specific classifications of development
projects, even if such projects are already in compliance with the current zoning code, effectively transforming projects that once enjoyed rightful ministerial exemptions into discretionary ones.106
For example, cities like San Francisco, Santa Monica, Pasadena, and others have “imposed discretionary [CEQA] review [processes] on ‘all residential development projects of five or more units,’” even if the project would be
otherwise within the current zoning requirements.107 In turn, these sorts of
actions often have the effect of “prevent[ing] housing construction in . . . communities rather than facilitat[ing] housing construction at the local level.”108
If an affluent area is not interested in building more housing, they can zone
their city to make it difficult to place any housing there, even if this is inconsistent with the needs of their own region and greater state.109 The end result
103. Alejandro E. Camacho & Nicholas J. Marantz, Beyond Preemption, Toward Metropolitan
Governance, 39 STAN. ENV’T L.J. 125, 149 (2020); see Bertrand, supra note 31, at 420 (“[A] 2018
survey of five of the most expensive Californian housing markets—San Francisco, Oakland, San Jose,
Redwood City, and Palo Alto—found that each local government has imposed discretionary review
on ‘all residential development projects of five or more units.’”).
104. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
105. See Eliza Hall, Divide and Sprawl, Decline and Fall: A Comparative Critique of Euclidean
Zoning, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 915, 918–19 (2007) (showing the strength that a municipality’s enacted
zoning ordinance has when “challenges to zoning ordinances will fail unless they show the ordinance
has no rational relation to the police power goals of health, safety, or welfare”); see, e.g., Vill. of Belle
Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (stating that it is within a municipality’s zoning power “to lay
out zones where family values . . . and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people”).
106. See Bertrand, supra note 31, at 420. An example of such a blanket classification is how San
Francisco and Palo Alto, along with other “expensive Californian housing markets,” have required
discretionary approval for “all residential development projects of five or more units . . . even if these
developments comply with the underlying zoning code.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
107. Id.
108. Ryan Forgione, A New Approach to Housing: Changing Massachusetts’s Chapter 40R from
an Incentive to a Mandate, 53 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 199, 216 (2020).
109. Id. (asserting that, “[e]ven though each municipality has the authority to build how much or
how little housing it desires, existing homeowners within each municipality often dominate local zoning decisions in favor of exclusionary zoning”); see also Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for
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of such localized power is “significantly less housing in desirable metropolitan areas and individual neighborhoods than the market would likely otherwise supply.”110
2. Enabling Individual Citizens To Abuse CEQA
CEQA also bolsters its own strength by empowering local citizens
through broad deputization and allowing CEQA claimants to file suit anonymously.111 CEQA allows for the deputization of Californians to anonymously
file a CEQA suit if they believe that a specific project will adversely impact
them.112 Generally, all a complaining party needs to show is that they have a
“beneficial interest” in the enforcement, which can be met by anyone with
“some special interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or
protected over and above the interest held in common with the public at
large.”113 This standard can be met even if the proponent’s concern is primarily economically motivated.114 However, many more trivial CEQA claims are

Dummies, 58 ALA. L. REV. 257, 263 (2006) (explaining that a 2001 survey of developers and town
planners showed that “70% of municipalities made their zoning rules more restrictive between 1997
and 2002, while only 16% reduced landowners’ regulatory burdens”).
110. John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing Crisis, 60 B.C.
L. REV. 823, 831 (2019). See also VICKI BEEN, INGRID GOULD ELLEN & KATHERINE O’REGAN,
SUPPLY SKEPTICISM: HOUSING SUPPLY AND AFFORDABILITY 3 (2018), https://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf (“A large number of cross-sectional studies show that
stricter (less strict) local land use regulations are associated with less (more) new construction and
higher (lower) prices.”).
111. See infra notes 112–22 and accompanying text.
112. Jeremy Rosenberg, Laws That Shaped L.A.: How the California Environmental Quality Act
Allows Anyone To Thwart Development, KCET (Feb. 6, 2012), https://www.kcet.org/history-society/laws-that-shaped-l-a-how-the-california-environmental-quality-act-allows-anyone-to-thwart-development (“CEQA is a self-executing statute[,] . . . and its provisions are enforced, as necessary, by
the public through litigation and the threat thereof.”).
113. Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep’t of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 901 (Cal. 2008)
(quoting Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. S.F. Airports Comm’n, 981 P.2d 499, 504 (Cal.
1999)); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 1907).
114. 8 ARTHUR F. COON, MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 26.23 (4th ed. 2021)
(citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 1907)); see Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005, 1011–12 (Cal. 2011) (outlining the requirements for “public interest
standing” under CEQA). Public interest standing is not a challenging standard to meet since “the
[petitioner] need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient
that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” Id.
(quoting Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 162 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1945)). But see Vill. of
Canajoharie v. Plan. Bd. of Fla., 882 N.Y.S.2d 526, 529 (App. Div. 2009) (holding that claims of
economic harm were insufficient to confer standing for a claim under SEQRA).

431

[Vol. 49: 413, 2022]

How California’s Premier Environmental Law
Has Worsened the State’s Housing Crisis
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

brought under an even lower “well-established exception” called public interest standing.115 This exception was firmly established for the first time in 2011
in Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach.116 Prior to
2011, some California appellate courts opted to hold to a “stricter ‘zone of
interest’ rule, which require[d] that a plaintiff’s interest fall ‘within the zone
of interests to be protected by the legal duty asserted.’”117 But, Save the Plastic Bag Coalition set the new standard, stating that public interest standing
applies
where the question is one of public right and the object of
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty[;] the [petitioner] need not show that he has any legal
or special interest in the result, since it is sufficient that he is
interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and the
duty in question enforced.118
Unfortunately, in laying out public interest standing, the court mandated
a state-wide standard that is “broad enough to capture even the most self-interested plaintiff.”119 Under public interest standing, a citizen does not even
need to live in the same zip code as the development project they are complaining of.120 If a party has standing, all that is required to file a claim and
begin the arduous process is a basic letter of appeal with an exemption

115. See Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr., 187 P.3d at 901 (stating that an exception to the “beneficial interest
rule” applies “[w]here the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure
the enforcement of a public duty”). In these instances, “it is sufficient that [the applicant] is interested
as a citizen in having the laws executed and the duty in question enforced.” Id.
116. 254 P.3d at 1011.
117. Jessica Diaz, Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach: California Supreme
Court Answers More than “Paper or Plastic?” in Major Decision on Corporate Standing Under
CEQA, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 627, 629 (2012).
118. 254 P.3d at 1011 (quoting Bd. of Soc. Welfare v. County of L.A., 162 P.2d 627, 628–29 (Cal.
1945)).
119. Diaz, supra note 117, at 633.
120. CEQA
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
PLAN. & CONSERVATION LEAGUE,
https://www.pcl.org/campaigns/ceqa/ceqa-faqs/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2021). This article does recognize that there could be beneficial uses for public interest standing since, as one scholar notes, “broad
public interest standing can be beneficial in protecting communities from adverse environmental impacts they are unaware of.” Ha Chung, Moving CEQA Away from Judicial Enforcement: Proposal
for a Dedicated CEQA Agency To Address Exclusionary Use of CEQA, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 319–
20 (2020).

432

[Vol. 49: 413, 2022]

How California’s Premier Environmental Law
Has Worsened the State’s Housing Crisis
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

determination, along with a filing fee.121 In light of the amount of work required by the developer once this appeal is filed, these filing requirements,
paired with the low standing threshold, serve as very low bars to entry to what
could potentially result in a very expensive process for a developer on the
other side.122 Furthermore, plaintiffs bringing a CEQA complaint are protected by a veil of anonymity, which means that “the true filer [is] unknown
to the judge, defending agency, or the public.”123 This anonymity can result
in a plaintiff filing suit “under the guise of a ‘public interest’ group, so that
nobody knows who the real opponent is.”124 Some CEQA critics have complained that allowing anonymous complaints harms the “public planning and
the democratic process” because it prevents the developer from ever getting
to work with the complaining party to seek a solution that is in the best interest
of both parties and the environment.125 Overall, this low threshold and anonymity provide potentially frivolous CEQA plaintiffs with low economic and
social costs to file a suit and slow down a project’s development.126
The empowerment of local citizens and development-reticent municipalities has resulted in various adverse economic impacts on developers.127 If a
municipality requires blanket discretionary approval for certain projects,128
then the developer will likely have to complete an EIR.129 Normally, if a
121. See S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATION CODE § 31.16 (2020).
122. See Christian Britschgi, How California Environmental Law Makes It Easy for Labor Unions
To Shake Down Developers, REASON (Aug. 21, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://reason.com/2019/08/21/how-california-environmental-law-makes-it-easy-for-labor-unions-to-shakedown-developers/ (explaining that all a filer needs to do to file the letter of appeal is to “write a very
standard” complaint, such as: “Your traffic analysis is wrong. Your air analysis is wrong. You haven’t
provided enough detail about this or that”).
123. California Environmental Quality Act: Judicial Challenge: Identification of Contributors:
Hearing on A.B. 2026 Before the Assembly Committee on Natural Resources, 2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2016) (“Individuals and groups file anonymously for many reasons[:] to slow down a competitor’s
project, to leverage for bargaining agreements, to maintain access to a ‘free’ commodity like water,
wind or sun, or to stop a plan for non-environmental reasons.”). In 2016, it was found that “45% of
CEQA lawsuits are filed anonymously.” Id.
124. Scott Peters, CEQA an Obstacle for Needed Housing in California, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(Mar. 3, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/commentary/sd-utbg-ceqaobstacles-peters-20170302-story.html.
125. Id.; see also Hernandez, supra note 31, at 42 (explaining that anti-SLAPP statutes protect those
filing anonymous CEQA lawsuits from being counter-sued, even if the complainant is filing its complaint for misguided or ill-intended reasons).
126. See Hernandez, supra note 31, at 42 (“[C]ourts demand only a few hundred dollars to accept a
new [CEQA] lawsuit.”).
127. See infra notes 128–37 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
129. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15060 (2005). The EIR will be required if a lead agency—which
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developer foresees the possibility that its proposed project will have an impact
on the environment, then they will prepare the report “as early as feasible in
the planning process.”130 However, if a party raises an objection to a project’s
approval and threatens a CEQA suit, then the developer could have to complete further mitigated negative declarations or supplement the EIR.131 EIRs
are generally extensive reports, often consisting of several hundred pages, that
can take up to a year to complete.132
If a deputized citizen decides to file a suit against a developer, this litigious process—which can halt any project for years—can have a cost starting
around $300,000 and can increase by roughly $1,500 per unit after that.133 For
developers faced with such a cumbersome CEQA process, there are typically
only two options available: pay the money and go through the full CEQA
process or give up the project completely.134 Many developers often choose
the latter and abandon their project before ever breaking ground.135 This issue
is especially salient for developers of low- to mid-income multifamily
determines whether the project meets the current permitting and entitlement standards—determines
that the project could have an environmental impact. See id. (“[T]he agency should be alert for environmental issues that might require preparation of an EIR or that may require additional explanation
by the applicant.”).
130. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15004(b) (2018).
131. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21166 (West 1977) (providing a list of triggering events for a
mitigated negative declaration); Friends of Coll. of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Cnty. Cmty.
Coll. Dist., 378 P.3d 687, 692 (Cal. 2016) (stating that, where “changes to a project or its circumstances
occur or new information becomes available after adoption of a negative declaration,” the agency may
have to “revis[e] the EIR”). Even where the changes to the initial plan are minor and a revision of the
EIR or an additional negative declaration is not required, “CEQA Guidelines . . . provide that an
agency [must] still prepare an addendum to a previously certified EIR.” Friends of Coll. of San Mateo
Gardens, 378 P.3d at 692.
132. See Planning and Environmental Review, SACRAMENTO CNTY., https://planning.saccounty.net/applicants/Pages/FAQ_ER.aspx#:~:text=About%2012%20to%2018%20weeks,
limits%20of%20CEQA%20noted%20above (last visited Nov. 6, 2021). See generally S.F. PLAN.
DEP’T,
1028
MARKET
STREET
PROJECT
(2016),
https://sfmea.sfplanning.org/2014.0241E_1028%20Market_Draft%20EIR.pdf (providing the necessary information for a
draft EIR). If a developer is only required to file a negative declaration, then that process could take
up to twelve to eighteen weeks to complete. See generally id.
133. See Bertrand, supra note 31, at 424; see also Hernandez, supra note 31, at 21 (explaining that,
after filing an EIR, developers will then often have to go through “at least three rounds of public notice
and comment before being eligible for approval by public votes of elected officials”).
134. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
135. See Bertrand, supra note 31, at 424 (asserting that “developers who might otherwise produce
valid affordable housing projects for the community are likely to drop out of the running” due to the
high costs associated with the CEQA process).

434

[Vol. 49: 413, 2022]

How California’s Premier Environmental Law
Has Worsened the State’s Housing Crisis
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

housing, who are generally already facing low profit margins.136 These developers cannot afford to watch as their already-low margins dwindle away
while litigating a CEQA suit, and thus CEQA claims may mean that their project is “dead on arrival.”137
3. Enabling Citizens Groups To Abuse CEQA—The Rise of
NIMBYism
These challenges faced by developers (particularly of low- and mid-income multifamily developments) involving CEQA have been exploited by a
group of development-reticent people commonly referred to as NIMBYs (not
in my backyard).138 NIMBY is a term given to people who, in an effort to
protect their home’s property value, are willing to go to great legal and political lengths to oppose any project that is potentially detrimental to their
home’s value.139 One scholar notes that NIMBYs have learned that CEQA
can become one of their greatest and sharpest weapons against increased
136. See The Cost of Affordable Housing: Does it Pencil Out?, URBAN.ORG, https://apps.urban.org/features/cost-of-affordable-housing/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2021) [hereinafter The Cost of Affordable Housing] (explaining that, given the high cost of development, “the rent the poorest families
can pay is too little to cover the costs of operating an apartment building, even if developers could
build that building for free”). Because “low-income housing” is rented at a substantially lower rate
than higher end housing, developers are likely to make less money from a given project in the long
run, and therefore local governments often have to motivate developers to build low-income housing
through incentives like subsidies and tax credits. See Eugene L. Meyer, Cities Need Affordable Housing, but Builders Want Big Profits. Can It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/09/business/affordable-housing-luxury-development-gentrification.html.
137. Peters, supra note 124; see The Cost of Affordable Housing, supra note 136; Cities Need Affordable Housing, but Builders Want Big Profits. Can It Work?, supra note 136. The issue of not
being able to wait out CEQA legislation also applies to smaller government-funded projects, such as
small parks or other neighborhood improvement projects, and thus, these projects are often “dead on
arrival . . . because governments can’t spare hundreds of thousands of dollars for the environmental
review process.” Peters, supra note 124.
138. See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text.
139. See David L. Schwed, Pretexual Takings and Exclusionary Zoning: Different Means to the
Same Parochial End, 2 ARIZ. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 53, 56–57 (2011). The term NIMBY relates to the
group’s impact on delaying the production of affordable housing and driving up its costs and has been
around since as early as 1997. See Hoffmaster v. City of San Diego, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 684, 694 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1997). One scholar recently recognized that NIMBYism is possibly the result of a “natural
psychological tendency to endorse something in theory, but not when it is proposed next door.”
KATHERINE L. EINSTEIN, DAVID M. GLICK & MAXWELL PALMER, NEIGHBORHOOD DEFENDERS:
PARTICIPATORY POLITICS AND AMERICA’S HOUSING CRISIS 4 (2020). Einstein points out that some
of the primary motivations for NIMBYs are things like the “fear [of] a loss in their home values . . .
or a decrease in the quality of their local public goods, like schools and parks.” Id. at 13 (citations
omitted).
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density in their communities.140 In fact, California courts have recognized that
“‘[NIMBY]’ plaintiffs are often at the forefront of private environmental enforcement in the public interest” and even that “CEQA enforcement is built
on such private enforcement.”141 Even though CEQA was created to protect
and preserve the environment and wild spaces, at the hands of NIMBYs,
CEQA can be wielded as a means of perpetuating chronic issues such as
homelessness, opposition to “economic and social mobility, racial segregation, [and lack of] economic growth and equality.”142
In the Los Angeles County region, data shows that CEQA lawsuits are
disparately used in “whiter, wealthier, [and] healthier communities.”143 In
fact, from 2013 to 2015, a study showed that “87[%] of all CEQA lawsuits . .
. contest[ed] infill projects,” and a majority of all CEQA suits in that period
were targeted towards residential projects.144 The idea that racial motivations
could be undergirding a portion of CEQA’s utilization is further supported by
a recent study by the Obama White House, which found that there is a correlation between “localized pressure to regulate land use” and “higher rates of
income segregation.”145 This study was consistent with another study showing that “each additional [land use] regulation is associated with a roughly one

140. See Is California’s Legacy Environmental Law Protecting Beauty or Blocking Affordable
Housing?, HOLLAND & KNIGHT (July 5, 2018) https://www.hklaw.com/en/news/intheheadlines/2018/07/is-californias-legacy-environmental-law-protecting (quoting Jennifer Hernandez, one
of the most prominent lawyers in the CEQA world, who recently stated that today, CEQA “is not about
the environment”—“[t]his signature environmental law is being hijacked to advance economic interests”).
141. Fams. Unafraid to Uphold Rural El Dorado Cnty. v. El Dorado Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 94
Cal. Rptr. 2d 205, 213 (Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added); see also Bowman v. City of Berkeley,
31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 455 (Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding in a CEQA case that even having a NIMBY
“‘personal interest’ in the outcome of the suit does not automatically preclude a fee award”).
142. Infranca, supra note 110, at 831–32 (citations omitted); see also How Gavin Newsom Can Stop
NIMBYs from Blocking Homeless Housing Projects, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-09-24/heres-one-smart-way-to-stop-nimbys-fromblocking-homeless-housing-projects (“[O]pponents of homeless housing projects in their neighborhoods use CEQA as a weapon to thwart those developments.”).
143. Hernandez, supra note 31, at 32.
144. Chung, supra note 120, at 329 (showing that “49[%] of [all CEQA] lawsuits [between 2013
and 2015] challenged high density apartment or condominium housing” and another “13[% were] . . .
directed at single family homes”).
145. THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT
TOOLKIT
10
(2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE].
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percentage point decrease in the multifamily permits.”146 Scholars noted that
this negative correlation is part due to the fact that each additional regulation
creates another point at which “members of the community can object to proposed housing projects, . . . [which] blocks or delays new housing.”147
Therefore, the use of CEQA—which serves as one of California’s largest
land use regulatory measures—has been retooled as a means of providing affluent communities with a means of excluding undesired groups from their
communities.148 Today’s use of CEQA in the wrong hands actually shares a
strange resemblance to the sorts of racially based tactics used to keep minorities out of white communities in the 1960s.149 Now, society looks back on
those racial practices of the 1960s with disdain and regret, and we will likely
look back on the current uses of racially motivated CEQA suits with a similar
eye.150 History will look favorably on those who act against such an injustice,
but who will act, and what can be done?151
Unsurprisingly, given the convoluted way in which CEQA litigation is
being used today, a recent study showed that CEQA lawsuits are actually
worsening the very thing that CEQA was made to protect: the environment.152
By brandishing CEQA as an antidevelopment tool, citizens warp the practical
implications of CEQA to mean that the law is “no longer focused on protecting forests and other natural lands, or fighting pollution sources like factories
and freeways.”153 Instead, it has “evolved into a legal tool most often used
against the higher density urban housing, transit, and renewable energy projects, which are all critical components of California’s climate priorities and
California’s ongoing efforts to remain a global leader on climate policy.”154
One example of the type of environmental impact that preventing multifamily
housing has created is increased vehicle pollution.155 If an economic hub that
146. EINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 139, at 67.
147. Id. at 66.
148. See HERNANDEZ & FRIEDMAN, supra note 98, at 17 (explaining that many of the current
NIMBY-driven uses of CEQA “are more evocative of a hoped-for past era of civil rights abuses than
the ‘modern’ self-image of wealthy, liberal—and notoriously NIMBY—coastal communities”).
149. See id. at 16–17 (quoting Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown, who stated that what is at stake in the
“discourse” surrounding CEQA is “not . . . environmental impacts, but competing visions of how to
shape urban living”); see also supra text accompanying note 149.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
153. Hernandez, supra note 31, at 24.
154. Id.
155. See Ally Schweitzer, Why the Housing Crisis Is a Problem for Everyone—Even Wealthy
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draws in numerous workers has insufficient housing to meet the demands of
those working in the region, this usually results in lower income individuals
being forced to move farther away from their place of work and to drive into
work each day.156 CEQA can also be used as a tool to harm the environment
by preventing or slowing the development of renewable energy projects, such
as wind turbine farms, solar farms, and desalination plants.157 Thus, in order
to realign CEQA with its originally intended purposes of holistic environmental preservation and the provision of a suitable place for every Californian to
live, the legislature must be prepared to undertake substantial reform
measures.158
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF CEQA
“The trouble is the political climate[;] that’s just kind of where we are. .
. . [Y]ou can’t change CEQA.”
–California Governor Jerry Brown159
In recognizing the numerous ways CEQA has been twisted to serve dubious purposes over the past decades, it is unsurprising that the call for reform
is not novel.160 Since its inception, many efforts have been made to make the
broad environmental statute more effective at serving its initially intended
purposes; unfortunately, however, the tale of CEQA reform is not one of great
victories but instead is filled with many failures and smaller, piecemeal successes along the way.161 This Section is not intended to serve as an exhaustive
Homeowners, NPR (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.npr.org/local/305/2020/01/13/795427706/why-thehousing-crisis-is-a-problem-for-everyone-even-wealthy-homeowners (asserting that “not building
housing can make traffic worse” by forcing “people [who] can’t afford to live near jobs . . . [to] move
somewhere cheaper and drive to work”).
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., Save Panacho Valley v. San Benito Cnty., 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 719, 725–28 (Dist. Ct.
App. 2013) (explaining how local farmers brought a CEQA claim against the county for its approval
of an EIR for a new solar farm); Citizens Opposing a Dangerous Env’t v. Cnty. of Kern, 174 Cal. Rptr.
3d 683, 686 (Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (analyzing a claim under CEQA that challenged the approval of an
EIR for a new wind turbine farm in Kern County); Surfrider Found. v. Cal. Reg’l Water Quality Control Bd., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 763, 768–70 (Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (discussing a challenge brought to an
EIR approved for a new desalinization plant in San Diego).
158. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
159. See infra note 161.
160. See supra Section II.D.
161. See infra Sections III.A, III.B. In a candid interview just before he ended his second stint

438

[Vol. 49: 413, 2022]

How California’s Premier Environmental Law
Has Worsened the State’s Housing Crisis
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

list of all of the proposed and enacted reforms but instead to highlight the most
critical reforms.162 Then, acknowledging the successes and failures of these
reforms, this Comment will take an in-depth look at numerous other states
who have also fought to reform environmental legislation similar to CEQA.163
Together, an analysis of California and other states’ reform efforts, along with
a look at an unrecognized blind spot, will paint a picture of a brighter future
for California’s landmark environmental legislation.164
A. Failed Legislative Attempts
In recent history, there were four broad categories of CEQA-related legislative amendments that failed to pass into law: litigation streamlining,165 judicial streamlining,166 regaining state zoning control by forcing municipalities
to up-zone,167 and piecemeal multifamily development strategies.168 First,
Senate Bill 995 sought to streamline CEQA litigation by keeping the litigation
process to a 270-day maximum so long as (1) the development would cost
more than $15 million, but less than $100 million, and (2) at least 15% of the
development’s units would qualify as affordable housing.169 This bill died
mostly due to fairly baseless criticisms that it was a “phony housing bill” that

serving as California’s Governor, Jerry Brown stated, “The trouble is the political climate[;] that’s just
kind of where we are. Very hard to—you can’t change CEQA.” Jim Newton, Gov. Jerry Brown: The
Long Struggle for the Good Cause, UCLA BLUEPRINT, https://blueprint.ucla.edu/feature/gov-jerrybrown-the-long-struggle-for-the-good-cause/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2021). This was the same Governor
who, in 2015, confidently stated: “I believe before I depart [as Governor,] we will see reform in
CEQA.” Bill Whalen, Oh Say Can You Reform CEQA? Not on Jerry Brown’s Watch, STAN. UNIV.
(Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/oh-say-can-you-reform-ceqa-not-jerry-brownswatch.
162. See infra Part III.
163. See infra Section III.B.
164. See infra Part III.
165. See infra text accompanying notes 169–74.
166. See infra notes 175–83 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 184–200 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 203–08 and accompanying text.
169. S.B. 995, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). The threshold requirement for what qualifies as
low-income housing is based on the median income of each California county. See CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 50079.5 (West 2002); see also Memorandum from Zachary Olmstead, Deputy Dir.
Div. of Hous. Pol’y Dev. 5–12 (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.hcd.ca.gov/grants-funding/income-limits/state-and-federal-income-limits/docs/income-limits-2020.pdf (providing a full list of all California
counties and their income brackets). For example, in Los Angeles, to qualify for low-income housing,
a family of four must not have a household income that exceeds $77,300, and in Marin County the
limit is $143,000. Memorandum, supra, at 7.
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rewarded the massive real estate developers.170 In light of these criticisms, it
is worth noting that one of the reasons these critiques were baseless is because
the average thirty-six unit apartment complex costs over $15 million to construct,171 and the $100 million project limitation would have prevented any
developers from using the bill for massive projects, such as new stadiums that
cost upwards of a billion dollars.172 Considering that CEQA litigation cases
have been known to last longer than a year,173 placing a time limit on CEQA
claims could have helped to strike the proper balance between respecting the
good in CEQA and expediting the process so developers’ projects are not unduly delayed.174
In comparison, Senate Bill 55 aimed to free the judicial backlog caused

170. Paul Koretz & Jeffrey Ebenstein, Critique of Housing Legislation Under Consideration by
California State Senate and Assembly, CITYWATCH (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.citywatchla.com/index.php/cw/los-angeles/20245-critique-of-housing-legislation-under-considerationby-california-state-senate-and-assembly. It is worth noting that one of the authors of this article opposing Senate Bill 995 is a city council member of one of the wealthiest areas of Los Angeles. See
Meet Paul Koretz, CITY OF L.A., http://www.councilmemberpaulkoretz.com/about-office/meet-paulkoretz (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
171. See Tara Mastroeni, How Much Does It Cost To Build Apartments?, MILLIONACRES (Feb. 4,
2021), https://www.millionacres.com/real-estate-investing/commercial-real-estate/how-much-doesit-cost-build-apartments/ (“On average, it cost $22 million to build an apartment building in 2020.”).
Considering there are over 670,000 multifamily structures at least this large across the country, these
are hardly outliers as far as real estate developers go. See Planning for Apartments, AM. PLAN. ASS’N,
https://www.planning.org/pas/reports/report139.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2021).
172. See The Cost of Building Housing Series, U.C. BERKELEY: TERNER CTR. FOR HOUS.
INNOVATION (Mar. 20, 2020), https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/construction-costs-serie. The $100
million project limitation would prevent the bill from being used for projects such as SoFi Stadium,
which cost a total of $5 billion dollars, or the new Chase Center Arena (home to the San Francisco
Warriors), which cost nearly $1.5 billion. See Jay Paris, SoFi Stadium Is Paying the Price for Lifting
Its Curtain During a Pandemic, FORBES (May 31, 2020, 1:13 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayparis/2020/05/31/sofi-stadium-is-paying-the-price-for-lifting-its-curtain-during-a-pandemic/?sh=45d330351a11; Scott Davis, Warriors President Rick Welts Explains Why Their New $1.4
Billion Self-Financed Stadium was a One-of-a-Kind Situation Other Teams Can’t Replicate, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 28, 2019, 1:19 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-chase-center-built-warriors-cost-perfect-storm-2019-3.
173. See, e.g., Golden Door Props., LLC v. Vallecitos Water Dist., No. D072280, 2018 WL
1465530 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2018) (lasting over one year); Fedge v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n,
No. B281700, 2018 WL 4767213 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2018) (lasting over a year-and-a-half).
174. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. California Assembly Bill 73 (AB 73), which
was passed in 2017, provides its own means of fast-tracking CEQA claims; however, the bill requires
too much of developers to be truly effective. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65582.1 (West 2020); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 66205 (West 2018); see also infra text accompanying notes 226–30 (discussing the
issues with AB 73).
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by complex CEQA litigation instead of streamlining future litigation.175 By
appointing specific judges to oversee CEQA-related disputes in any California city with a population of over 200,000 people—affecting over twenty-two
cities statewide—this bill hoped that judges would “develop expertise in
CEQA and certain related laws so that those judges [would] be available to
hear and quickly resolve actions or proceedings alleging noncompliance with
CEQA.”176 With such a large number of CEQA cases being brought in large
urban regions, this bill would result in most CEQA cases now being decided
by judges familiar with CEQA and its technicalities.177 For smaller cities that
could not have a CEQA-designated judge, this bill would have allowed those
courts to transfer the case to be heard “by a judge with expertise in CEQA.”178
Lastly, Senate Bill 55 would have also created state-wide mandated CEQA
exemptions for supportive housing and would have required states to follow
the mandate.179
Given that the average California judge hears 288 cases in one year, Senate Bill 55 was a practical solution considering the fact that the one designated
CEQA-qualified judge would only be required to handle about sixty CEQA
cases each year—far from a full-time commitment.180 Allowing knowledgeable judges to interpret the CEQA statutes would be an important step for
CEQA’s future, since stare decisis has played such a large role in CEQA’s
application.181 This could have been an effective tool to alleviate the housing
crisis in many California cities while giving these shelters the necessary
CEQA shields.182 Unfortunately, after undergoing numerous amendments,
Senate Bill 55 eventually died in the state Senate and joined the long list of
CEQA reform efforts never passed.183
175. See S.B. 55, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
176. Id. In California, there were twenty-two cities with populations of over 200,000. California
Cities by Population, CAL. DEMOGRAPHICS BY CUBIT, https://www.california-demographics.com/cities_by_population (last visited Sept. 27, 2021). Looking to practical solutions to appoint specific
judges to CEQA cases alone, Senate Bill 55 proposes hiring retired judges to oversee such cases. See
S.B. 55.
177. See S.B. 55; see also supra note 144 and accompanying text (explaining how most CEQA suits
filed recently were filed in urban regions).
178. See S.B. 55.
179. See id.
180. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS 106 (2002)
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/sccs02.pdf.
181. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
183. See S.B. 55. California Senate Bill 55 was also the first CEQA bill in recent history to specifically address the racial impact of CEQA by stating that “all public agencies should give consideration
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The third attempted CEQA reform strategy involved the California legislature indirectly revoking the power to make certain zoning and development
decisions from municipalities by creating state-mandated upzoning, specifically near “transit-rich areas.”184 This bill came at a time when many cities
were attempting to place new multifamily housing developments near transitrich areas, hoping the new residents would be more likely to utilize public
transit if they were within walking distance.185 However, these efforts often
faced CEQA challenges.186 One example of such a project was in West Covina, California, where complainants took issue with the local agency’s EIR
approval for a “68-unit, mixed use, infill project” that would be a quarter-mile
away from a railway station.187 The primary environmental concern cited by
the claimants was that the development did not provide enough parking
spaces.188 To assist public-transit-centered projects such as this one, legislative efforts have attempted to allow such developers to bypass certain EIR
requirements.189
One example of such a reform effort was Senate Bill 827.190 Senate Bill
827 was the California legislature’s attempt to bypass a locality’s area-specific CEQA speed bumps191 by requiring local governments to grant

to environmental justice by ensuring the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of people of all
races, incomes, and national origins.” Id. While this brief statement does not rectify the racial inequities driven by the bad incentives of CEQA, it is a start to recognition. See id.
184. See infra text accompanying notes 185–200 (discussing the issues with municipalities having
so much control over their zoning and development decisions). “Upzoning” has been defined as “a
change in zoning classification from less intensive to more intensive” that can be caused by the “use,”
“height,” or “bulk” of a property. Richard W. Bartke & John S. Lamb, Upzoning, Public Policy, and
Fairness—A Study and Proposal, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 702 n.10 (1976).
185. See S.B. 827, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); News Release: Major Affordable Housing
Development is Currently Under Construction in the City of Santa Clara, CITY OF SANTA CLARA (Jan.
15, 2021, 3:57 PM), https://www.santaclaraca.gov/Home/Components/News/News/42347/3171.
186. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 187–88.
187. Covina Residents for Responsible Dev. v. City of Covina, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 554 (Dist.
Ct. App. 2018).
188. Id. at 558 (stating that the plaintiff’s “principal CEQA challenge focused on the project’s allegedly inadequate parking”). There is certainly irony in the fact that the primary complaint brought
against a development geared towards public transit was that there was not enough parking space
provided for personal vehicles. See id.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 197–99; see supra note 33 and accompanying text (providing the costs associated with meeting EIR requirements when requested).
190. See S.B. 827.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 106–10.
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development projects near transit-rich areas if the project met certain standards.192 The bill faced opposition from multiple sides, the most obvious of
which was local governments who did not want their local decision-making
restricted.193 Another voice of opposition came from environmental organizations who did not want to see the power of CEQA taken out of the hands of
the citizens.194 Lastly, low-income community advocates opposed the bill out
of fear that Senate Bill 827 would disproportionately displace people of color
through gentrification.195 Although a valiant effort at reform, the aforementioned opposition was too much for the bill to survive.196
Only a few short years after Senate Bill 827’s failure, California’s Senate
tried and failed to pass Senate Bill 50, which also focused on requiring municipalities to approve multifamily housing near transit centers; however, Senate Bill 50 faced similar opposition to its predecessor.197 On top of the same
criticism that Senate Bill 827 faced, many California residents were annoyed
that the state legislature was essentially repackaging the same bill for the third
time in an attempt to get it through.198 Then, in August 2020, Senate Bill
192. See S.B. 827.
193. See Liam Dillon, A Major California Housing Bill Failed After Opposition from the Low-Income Residents It Aimed To Help. Here’s How It Went Wrong, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 2018, 12:05 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-housing-bill-failure-equity-groups-20180502-story.html.
194. See supra text accompanying note 112.
195. See sources cited supra note 84. Often, low-income communities equate more development
with more gentrification of their neighborhoods. See generally Grace Watkins, Ashley Fulton, Ivan
Moreno & Rocky Rivera, Gentrification in Los Angeles: Describing and Mitigating the Effects of
Neighborhood-Level Displacement, GENTRIFICATION IN L.A. (Apr. 5, 2021), https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/c62eefccdc424603ba4603deff2119d7. This is not an unfounded fear considering that the number of “gentrified” neighborhoods is on the rise and gentrification generally has a
negative effect on the original residents. See Mapping Neighborhood Change & Gentrification in
Southern California County, URB. DISPLACEMENT PROJECT, https://www.urbandisplacement.org/map/socal (last visited Nov. 6, 2021). See generally Emily Chong, Examining the Negative
Impacts of Gentrification, GEO. L. (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.law.georgetown.edu/poverty-journal/blog/examining-the-negative-impacts-of-gentrification/ (discussing the various negative impacts
of gentrification on poorer communities “such as forced displacement, a fostering of discriminatory
behavior by people in power, and a focus on spaces that exclude low-income individuals and people
of color”).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 193–95.
197. S.B. 50, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020); see also Liam Dillon & Taryn Luna, California
Bill To Dramatically Increase Home Building Fails for the Third Year in a Row, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2020, 4:49 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-01-29/high-profile-california-housing-bill-to-allow-mid-rise-apartments-near-transit-falls-short.
198. See Dan Brekke, It’s SB 827, the Sequel: Wiener Introduces Revamped Bill To Spur Housing
Near Transit, KQED (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.kqed.org/news/11709817/its-sb-827-take-2-wienerintroduces-revamped-bill-to-require-more-housing-near-transit.
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902—what some would consider a “softer” version of Senate Bill 50 and Senate Bill 827—also died in the state assembly for similar reasons.199 Senate
Bill 902 differed from Senate Bill 50 and Senate Bill 827 because, instead of
trying to take back zoning control from municipalities, Senate Bill 902 sought
to “supersede local zoning rules that . . . limit[] density”; however, even this
opposition proved to be too much, and the bill died in the face of similar criticisms as Senate Bills 827 and 50.200 Despite the failures of Senate Bills 50,
827, and 902, increasing the stock of multifamily housing near transit hubs
makes both environmental and practical sense.201 Such developments would
not only benefit the environment by encouraging greater use of public transit
systems but also make practical sense because living near public transit is
often most important to “lower-income people who can’t afford cars” and,
thus, have a higher likelihood of using conveniently located public transportation.202
A fourth reform strategy that was more of a slow-and-steady approach to
CEQA reform sought to increase the usability of a single-family zoned parcel
by one unit at a time.203 This method saw its first success in California in 2019
with the passage of Assembly Bill 68 (AB 68).204 After the bill’s passage,
accessory dwelling units (ADUs) could be added onto a residential or mixeduse property with ministerial approval,205 meaning the projects are not subject
to CEQA’s discretionary approval process.206 Then, in 2020, to build upon
the success of AB 68’s passage, California sought to pass Senate Bill 1120,
which would allow ministerial approval to turn a single-family zoned parcel
into a duplex, thus doubling the housing potential of a single-family parcel.207
199. See S.B. 902, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020).
200. John Myers, After SB 50’s Defeat, California Lawmaker Unveils ‘Light Touch’ Housing Density Bill, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020, 9:00 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-0309/california-new-housing-density-bill-scott-wiener-post-sb50-sb902.
201. See infra text accompanying note 202.
202. Gillian B. White, Stranded: How America’s Failing Public Transportation Increases Inequality, ATLANTIC (May 16, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/05/stranded-howamericas-failing-public-transportation-increases-inequality/393419/ (quoting Rosabeth Moss Kanter,
Professor of Business at Harvard Business School).
203. See infra text preceding notes 204–07.
204. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.2 (West 2021); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65852.22 (West 2020).
205. See GOV’T § 65852.2; GOV’T § 65852.22.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 69–71.
207. See Single-Family Zoning Reform: An Analysis of SB 1120, U.C. BERKELEY: TERNER CTR.
FOR HOUS. INNOVATION (July 30, 2020), https://ternercenter.berkeley.edu/blog/sb-1120/ (estimating
that “5,977,061 single-family parcels in California meet minimum lot size and historic district criteria
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This bill failed to pass in 2020; however, its failure was attributed to legislative procedural issues instead of any substantive opposition like the aforementioned bills, and thus, there is hope that Senate Bill 1120 could see success in
another year.208 In the meantime, AB 68 serves as a fairly successful piecemeal reform to CEQA in order to correct the housing shortage.209 In fact, from
2018 to 2020, ADU permits in California increased from 9,000 to over
12,000.210
B. Fatal Flaws—“Successful” Legislative Efforts
On the increasingly rare occasion that a CEQA reform bill does get passed
into law, the bill often is not nearly as helpful as anticipated.211 Often, to get
passed the bills have to go through so many concessions that many of their
benefits are “watered down.”212 Three prominent, recently passed CEQA reform bills—Senate Bill 35, Assembly Bill 73, and Senate Bill 540—did try to
right certain CEQA wrongs, but all three bills contain fatal flaws, leaving
CEQA reform advocates, and even the past California Governor himself, disappointed with each bill’s practical outcome.213
First, Senate Bill 35 specifically targets communities that are not meeting
their region’s projected housing needs and streamlines their development approval process by categorizing the projects as ministerial.214
This
to be eligible for a lot split under bill SB 1120”).
208. See Andrew Khouri, Bid To Allow Duplexes on Most California Lots Dies After Assembly
Approval Comes Too Late, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2020, 12:51 PM), https://www.latimes.com/homeless-housing/story/2020-09-01/california-assembly-sb-1120-duplexes (stating that a primary reason
that the bill did not pass was because it was not brought up for a vote before the assembly until thirty
minutes before the bill’s deadline). This year, the legislature again proposed Senate Bill 9, which is
nearly an identical version of Senate Bill 1120. See S.B. 9, 2020–2021 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021).
209. See infra text accompanying note 210.
210. About Accessory Dwelling Units, CAL. ADU, https://www.aducalifornia.org/ (last visited Sept.
28, 2021).
211. See Ben Adler & Emily Zentner, Video: Jerry Brown Looks Back on Some of His Major Policy
Decisions as Governor, CAPRADIO (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.capradio.org/articles/2019/01/04/video-jerry-brown-looks-back-on-some-of-his-major-policy-decisions-as-governor/.
212. Id. In his interview just prior to leaving the California Governor’s office, Jerry Brown stated,
“I did try some changes [to CEQA,] but . . . even the small changes were watered down before they
got enacted.” Id.
213. See infra notes 214–40 and accompanying text (providing a broad overview and criticism of
Senate Bill 35, Assembly Bill 73, and Senate Bill 540); Bertrand, supra note 31, at 428–37 (providing
an in-depth analysis and critique of these bills).
214. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65400 (West 2021); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65913.4 (West 2021); JOHN
PAUL HANNA & DAVID VAN ATTA, CALIFORNIA COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENTS: LAW AND
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measurement is based off of state-wide regional allocation goals for multifamily housing, and therefore, quantifies each region’s housing needs and
then requires those regions to plan to match the need.215 Considering that, as
of 2018, 97.6% of cities and counties in California were not meeting their
Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) goals, Senate Bill 35 had the
potential to impact nearly every California region.216 Senate Bill 35 removes
certain barriers, like municipalities imposing costly parking space requirements,217 and gives the municipality only sixty to ninety days to object to a
given project based on objective criteria.218 In summary, Senate Bill 35 could
be described as a form of legislative arm twisting for those regions that were
reticent to keep their low-income housing supply up with the demand.219
Alternatively, Senate Bill 540 takes a different approach; instead of punishing development-reticent regions, Senate Bill 540 rewards those regions
wanting to develop low-income multifamily housing but also desiring a simpler path through CEQA.220 Under the bill, local governments wanting to
PRACTICE § 12.28 (2020) (providing an overview of Senate Bill 35).
215. See GOV’T § 65400. The Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA) is a state-mandated
tool for municipalities to quantify their region’s housing need. Housing Element, CAL. DEP’T HOUS.
& CMTY. DEV., https://www.hcd.ca.gov/community-development/housing-element/index.shtml (last
visited Sept. 30, 2021). It requires local governments to “adopt its housing element as part of its
overall General Plan” so that they can match the anticipated need in their community. Id.
216. Katy Murphy, Housing Shortage: New Report Shows How California Cities and Counties
Stack Up, MERCURY NEWS (Feb. 2, 2018, 3:34 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/02/01/housing-shortage-new-report-shows-how-california-cities-and-counties-stackup/.
217. See Hannah Hoyt & Jenny Schuetz, Parking Requirements and Foundations are Driving Up
the Cost of Multifamily Housing, BROOKINGS (June 2, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/parking-requirements-and-foundations-are-driving-up-the-cost-of-multifamily-housing/.
“Most local zoning laws stipulate a minimum number of off-street parking spaces that must accompany new housing”; however, parking space requirements can vastly increase a development’s cost.
Id. This is especially salient in high-density areas such as Los Angeles and San Francisco where new
housing is needed most. Id.
218. See GOV’T § 65400. If a municipality does object to a Senate Bill 35-qualifying development
based on the objective standard of review, the municipality must describe with particularity what the
objective standard is that the developer must meet. See Order Granting Consolidated Petitions for
Writ of Mandate at 12–37, 40 Main St. Offs., LLC v. City of Los Altos (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2020)
(No. 19CV349845) (explaining that a city’s objection that a development did not meet “adequate”
parking requirements was not an objective standard of review sufficient to deny development under
Senate Bill 35 and requiring a city to provide a ministerial permit for a project satisfying Senate
Bill 35’s requirements).
219. See supra text accompanying note 218.
220. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65621 (West 2019). See generally Bertrand, supra note 31, at 433–
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increase their region’s housing stock can establish a Workforce Housing Opportunity Zone (WHOZ).221 To create a WHOZ, the city or county completes
an EIR covering the whole WHOZ.222 Then, once approved, the city or county
is eligible for state funding for future development projects as long as the developments designate a portion of the housing as low-income.223 Because the
EIR is already completed and paid for by the municipality, developers do not
have to complete a separate EIR for any qualifying projects within the
WHOZ.224 Thus, Senate Bill 540 allows developers to be at ease and focus
on their projects behind an artificial CEQA shield.225
While Senate Bill 540 provides financial incentives for creating new affordable housing, another bill—Assembly Bill 73 (AB 73)—similarly provides financial incentives to willing municipalities.226 But instead of incentivizing the creation of new affordable housing, AB 73 focuses on
incentivizing the preservation of affordable housing.227 Similar to Senate Bill
540, AB 73 frontloads the EIR requirements for developments and provides
additional funding to municipalities to support future qualifying projects.228
But unlike Senate Bill 540, AB 73 includes a provision to ensure municipalities fulfill their end of the affordable-housing bargain.229 If the Department of
Housing and Community Development ever finds that the given district has
fallen out of compliance with Assembly Bill 73, then the district must pay
back all of the funding.230
Overall, while Senate Bill 540, AB 73, and Senate Bill 35 were likely all
well-intended and do ostensibly provide CEQA shields, each of them has the
35.
221. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65620–65625 (West 2017). To qualify, a zone must be planned to
support “a minimum of 100 units to a maximum of 1,500 residential dwelling units.” GOV’T §
65621(a)(1).
222. See GOV’T §§ 65620–65625.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 227–30.
227. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65582.1 (West 2020); see also Bertrand, supra note 31, at 435–37
(discussing Assembly Bill 73 in depth).
228. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21155.10 (West 2017). Unlike Senate Bill 540, which used
WHOZs, Assembly Bill 73 established “housing sustainability districts.” See CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 66201 (West 2019).
229. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 66210 (West 2018).
230. Id. “If a city, county, or city and county reduces the density of sites within the district from
the levels required, . . . the city, county, or city and county shall return the full amount of zoning
incentive payments it has received . . . to the department.” Id.
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same critical flaw preventing it from achieving its goals.231 Likely due to legislative concessions needed to pass the bills, all three require developers to
pay prevailing wages to all laborers, workers, and mechanics during the development phase.232 This stipulation can have a negative effect on a developer’s desire to utilize the statutory shields since “[p]roject labor costs at prevailing wage rates may be significantly higher than anticipated and may
quickly surpass the cost benefit conferred by the public assistance.”233 In
some cases, the increased cost due to prevailing wages could “increase construction costs anywhere between twelve percent and forty-eight percent.”234
Considering the already slim profit margins that low- to mid-income multifamily developers operate under, increasing their labor costs could essentially
mute any benefits the bill would have provided.235
Furthermore, a brief look at California’s Labor Code reveals that it is unlikely that California legislators could claim ignorance regarding the negative
impact prevailing wage stipulations have on low- to mid-income developments.236 For example, California Labor Code Section 1720(c)(4) creates certain exemptions from having to pay prevailing wages to developers of low- to

231. See infra note 232 and accompanying text; Bertrand, supra note 31, at 441–42 (stating that
“the prevailing wages and skilled and trained workforce requirements . . . take a substantial bite out of
th[e] savings” the bills provide).
232. See A.B. 73, 2019–2020 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (enacted); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65623(b)(9)(B)
(West 2019) (requiring “all construction workers employed in the execution of the project” to be “paid
at least the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for the type of work and geographic area”).
“California’s prevailing wage laws mandate that all bidders use the same legally[ ]established wage
rates when bidding.” CAL. STATE TREASURER’S OFF., AFFORDABLE HOUSING COST STUDY 37
(2014), https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/ctcac/affordable_housing.pdf; CAL. LAB. CODE § 1723 (West
2001).
233. Stephen J. Fowler, Contractor Beware: The Fine Line Between “Public Works” and “Private
Projects” Under California’s Prevailing Wage Law, 20 MILLER & STARR REAL EST. NEWSL. 1. 1
(2010), https://www.jdsupra.com/post/fileServer.aspx?fName=e80495714068-4d34-ad3f-14790e56c7dd.pdf.
234. Bertrand, supra note 31, at 441.
235. See supra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 237–39 and accompanying text.
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mid-income housing.237 The statute reveals two things.238 First, legislators
are already aware of the issues prevailing wage requirements pose for developers.239 Second, in order to create beneficial CEQA shields like Senate Bill
540, AB 73, and Senate Bill 35 without including prevailing wage requirements, the California legislature would likely have to explicitly provide such
a statutory exemption similar to those provided in § 1720(c)(4), which the
legislature ultimately chose not to do.240
C. Has the Legislature Found a CEQA Backdoor? The False Hope of Bonus
Density Programs.
Recently, many have referred to the bonus density strategy as a CEQA
backdoor; however, this is not necessarily the case.241 In short, “[a] density
bonus is an increase in the overall number of housing units that a developer
may build on a site in exchange for including more affordable housing units
in the project.”242 Using San Diego as essentially a bonus density pilot program, legislators interpreted the county’s early indications of success as a
green light to take the efforts statewide with Assembly Bill 2345 and Senate
Bill 1085.243 This was because, in the early years of its density bonus program, San Diego experienced a “490 percent increase annually for the number
of projects applying to use the [density bonus] program.”244 However, there
237. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1720 (West 2021). Normally, any developer that receives public funding or public assistance (such as CEQA exemptions) would be required to pay prevailing wages on
the project, unless one of the exemptions applied. See id. It is also worth noting that the legislature
added recent amendments to Section 1720 in 2017, the same year as Senate Bill 540, Assembly Bill
73, and Senate Bill 35’s enaction. Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 1720 (West 2017) (requiring payment
of prevailing wages unless an exemption applied), with LAB. § 1720 (2021) (amending to include
when a public subsidy is de minimis).
238. See infra text accompanying notes 239–40.
239. See supra text accompanying note 237.
240. See LAB. § 1720(c)(4). An explicitly created statute is necessary because California courts will
“liberally construe” whether public assistance for a development project is exempt from prevailing
wage requirements. See State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. Duncan, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d
507, 535 (Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (citation omitted).
241. See infra notes 246–51 and accompanying text.
242. About, S.F. PLAN., https://sfplanning.org/home-sf (last visited Oct. 1, 2021). See generally
JON GOETZ & TOM SAKAI, GUIDE TO CALIFORNIA DENSITY BONUS LAW 2–3 (2021),
https://www.meyersnave.com/wp-content/uploads/California-Density-Bonus-Law_2021.pdf (providing an overview of how Bonus Density Housing works).
243. See A.B. 2345, 2019–2020 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (enacted); S.B. 1085, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2020).
244. COLIN PARENT & MAYA ROSAS, GOOD BARGAIN: AN UPDATED EVALUATION OF THE CITY OF
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are two reasons that it may be too early to conclude that bonus density has
actually been successful in San Diego.245
First, the increase in San Diego is only for applications, and there are no
figures yet on how many of these projects actually broke ground without facing CEQA suits.246 Second, the standard CEQA discretionary approvals still
apply even to bonus density housing.247 This was illustrated in Wollmer v.
City of Berkeley, where the court held that only some density bonus projects
will receive CEQA exemptions.248 In fact, if a prior or current EIR shows the
increased “bonus” units on the property will cause an adverse impact on the
surrounding environment, then the project is not exempt from CEQA.249
Given that the very purpose of bonus density programs is to allow more housing units on a property than might have been allowed under the current zoning
plan, it is highly likely that a project using bonus density would be vulnerable
to CEQA.250 Therefore, the recent density bonus legislation, like so many
other ostensibly helpful and well-intended CEQA reform efforts, is unlikely
to be a path to making the necessary radical reforms.251
D. Municipalities Taking Matters into Their Own Hands
In light of the California legislature’s aforementioned struggles to reform
CEQA, some local governments have attempted to take matters into their own
SAN DIEGO’S AFFORDABLE HOMES BONUS PROGRAM 12 (2020), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/circulatesd/pages/1316/attachments/original/1591816951/AHBP_status_report_2020_
newlogos.pdf?1591816951 [hereinafter Good Bargain].
245. See infra notes 246–50 and accompanying text.
246. See PARENT & ROSAS, supra note 244, at 3 (establishing that the 490% increase is for
“appl[ications] to use the [bonus density] program,” not for increases in actual construction projects).
247. See infra notes 248–49 and accompanying text.
248. 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 781, 794 (Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
249. See GOETZ & SAKAI, supra note 242, at 11 (noting that “[n]ot all density bonus projects will
qualify for one of the[] CEQA exemptions” and that these projects “may require additional CEQA
analysis for approval”).
250. See, e.g., About, supra note 242 (explaining that density bonus programs are “designed to incentivize building more affordable and family-friendly housing in neighborhood commercial and
transit corridors through zoning modifications”).
251. See supra text accompanying note 231. It is also worth mentioning that, unlike other recent
CEQA reform efforts, Senate Bill 2345 and Assembly Bill 1085 do not require developers to pay
workers prevailing wages. See A.B. 2345, 2019–20 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (enacted); S.B. 1085,
2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020). But even despite the lack of prevailing wage requirement, the laws
are still ineffective as wholesale CEQA solutions for the reasons described above. See supra text
accompanying notes 246–50.
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hands.252 Unfortunately, their local efforts to loosen CEQA’s grip over development projects have been met with judicial repudiation.253 This is because
CEQA’s judicial precedent over the last fifty years has established a rule that
a municipality can restrict CEQA exemptions and review, but it cannot loosen
them.254 The idea is that local governments are allowed to restrict CEQA exemptions because this furthers interests of environmental oversight, while any
local ordinances liberalizing CEQA’s implementations could allow harmful
developmental projects.255
One recent example of a county attempting to reclassify what projects
could receive ministerial exemptions was seen in Protecting Our Water &
Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus.256 In Protecting Our Water, a central California county wanted to lessen the burden of CEQA on developers of water wells, so it created a blanket ministerial classification for
such wells.257 In response to this blanket classification, an anonymous group
of plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the classification was unlawful, and the
California Supreme Court agreed.258 The Court reminded the county, pursuant to past precedent, that CEQA should be interpreted “to afford the fullest
possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.”259 This interpretation is apparently most consistent with the
“Legislature’s [CEQA] objectives: to reduce or avoid environmental damage
by requiring project changes when feasible.”260
The county argued for a broader interpretation of the CEQA guidelines
by stating that the county—acting vicariously through its local agency—had
the discretion to make the blanket exception, saving both the county and developers time and money instead of having to apply the discretionary

252. See infra notes 256–57 and accompanying text.
253. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text.
256. 472 P.3d 459, 462–63 (Cal. 2020).
257. See id.
258. Id. Water rights have long been a disputed, politically driven topic in California’s Central
Valley, where Stanislaus County is located. See generally Susan G. Ehrlich, Whither Water in California?, 43 REAL EST. REV. J., no. 4 (2014) (discussing the decades-long disputes over Central California’s water usage).
259. Protecting Our Water, 472 P.3d at 468 (quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors,
502 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Cal. 1972)).
260. Id. (citing Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 362 P.3d 792, 797
(Cal. 2015)).
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procedures each time.261 According to the guidelines, the county argued that
“determination of what is ‘ministerial’ can most appropriately be made by the
particular public agency involved based upon its analysis of its own laws.”262
The Court disagreed, however, and armed with precedent and judicial interpretation of the legislature’s objectives, the Court held that the blanket ministerial classification could not be given to a class of projects where there might
sometimes need to be the “exercise of independent judgement.”263 The Court
also concluded that the type of CEQA classifications made by the city were
not justifiable just because they were in the best interest of “alacrity and economy.”264
Multiple times throughout its opinion, the Court reminded the county that
while it was now allowed to apply blanket ministerial approval to a whole
category of projects, “[t]he agency may classify other types of project approvals as ministerial on a ‘case-by-case basis.’”265 However, if a municipality
were to follow the case-by-case process deemed proper by the Court, this
would not provide the much needed streamlining that counties like Stanislaus
were aiming for.266 Despite the Court’s attempts to explain that its decision
was narrow, the decision may still have fairly broad ramifications by
“lower[ing] the threshold for the type and degree of discretion that triggers
CEQA review” and by creating another level of unpredictability in the CEQA
process.267 Overall, Protecting Our Water served to remind counties of their
261. Id. at 469–70.
262. Id. at 470 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15268 (2005)). The court told the county that it
wrongly interpreted the CEQA code’s meaning and that it was not the county’s job to “determine the
scope and meaning of an ordinance as a matter of law” because that is the job of the court. Id. at 470–
71.
263. Id. at 471.
264. Id. at 472.
265. Id. at 470 (citation omitted).
266. See Niran Somasundaram, Supreme Court of California Weighs in on Blanket Categorization
of Well Construction Permit Approvals as Ministerial, JD SUPRA (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/supreme-court-of-california-weighs-in-22368/ (“It appears that Courts will be far
more lenient and deferential to permitting agencies if ministerial categorizations are made for particular permits on a case-by-case basis.”).
267. Austin Cho & Christian Marsh, California Supreme Court Throws the Barn Doors Open, Finding That Groundwater Well Permits Aren’t Necessarily Ministerial, JD SUPRA (Sept. 3, 2020) (citation
omitted), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/california-supreme-court-throws-the-40041/; see also
Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondents, supra note 58, at 41 (citing CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 14,
§§ 15258(b)(1), 15369 (2005)) (arguing that holding for the petitioner here would “subvert CEQA into
an instrument for the oppression and delay of development” and would “contravene the Legislature’s
clear direction that more, rather than less, ministerial permitting is a key element in meeting the
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judicially enforced inability to create broad CEQA reform on their own.268
Instead, counties hoping for a more streamlined and efficient version of
CEQA must continue to hope that the California legislature will take further
action.269
Therefore, reviewing California’s recent actions surrounding CEQA, it
seems every step forward has been met with another step back.270 Whether it
is new legislation such as Senate Bill 35, AB 73, Senate Bill 540, or proposed
legislation that simply fails to see the light of day, it appears that no complete
CEQA solution is readily available.271 This lack of legislative solution, compounded with the California courts’ restriction on how municipalities can create their own reforms,272 suggests California should look externally to other
states for effective reforms and also expand its idea of what kind of developments should benefit from these reforms.273
IV. A BRIGHTER FUTURE FOR THE GOLDEN STATE
As stated earlier, while California was the first state to enact a little
NEPA, it was not the only state to do so.274 Nor is California the only state
that struggles to strike the right balance between preserving the environment’s
future and enabling the development of requisite housing.275 Seeking the correct the balance, three states in particular—Massachusetts, Minnesota, and
New York—reformed their environmental statutes in ways that can provide
California with solutions to its own CEQA barriers.276 If California combines

[s]tate’s housing crisis”).
268. See 472 P.3d at 467.
269. See supra notes 263–66 and accompanying text.
270. See infra text accompanying notes 271–73.
271. See supra Sections III.A, III.B, III.C.
272. See supra Section III.D.
273. See infra Part IV.
274. See supra text accompanying note 54 (explaining that the states that have created their own
“little NEPAs” are California, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin).
275. See infra Section IV.A.
276. See infra Section IV.A. The three states analyzed below are Massachusetts, New York, and
Minnesota. See infra Section IV.A. These states were selected for two reasons: according to recent
reports, they are struggling with similar housing shortage issues to California, and these states have
taken innovative steps to reform their environmental regulations relating to development. See generally THE HOUSING SUPPLY SHORTAGE, supra note 23 (providing details surrounding California’s
housing shortage compared to other states).
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these solutions with a final change involving a perspective shift on which type
of developments are impacted by CEQA reform, then there could be a brighter
future for CEQA after all.277
A. Lessons from Other States
1. Lessons from Massachusetts in Accelerating and Simplifying
Approval. Sort of.
Prior to CEQA’s enactment in 1972, Massachusetts already foresaw the
impending issues coinciding with affordable housing and local municipality
control over land use decisions.278 Its response was to enact Massachusetts
Chapter 40B, which served as the most popular “antisnob zoning” legislation.279 Similar to California’s Senate Bill 35 utilization of RHNA, Chapter
40B established a legislative override for regions where there is not enough
affordable housing units.280 However, instead of establishing a tool like
RHNA that first tries to project the amount of housing that each specific region will need in the future and then tries to incentivize regions to meet that
projection, Chapter 40B takes a simpler, more practical approach.281 Massachusetts instead uses a uniform measurement across all cities by requiring that
at least 10% of each region’s housing qualify as affordable.282 For enforcement, the statute provides that if a low- or mid-income housing developer applies for permitting and the local agency denies the permit, then the developer
can appeal to the state-controlled Housing Appeals Committee (HAC).283 If
the HAC finds that the region that denied the permit has not met the 10%
threshold, then the state commission is empowered to grant the permit regardless.284 Chapter 40B also aims to expedite the application approval process.285
277. See infra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
278. See Infranca, supra note 110, at 837–39; see also supra Section II.D.1 (discussing the issues
that arise from granting local municipalities too much zoning control).
279. Infranca, supra note 110, at 839; see MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 2 (West 2018).
280. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, §§ 20–21 (West 2018).
281. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing how RHNAs work).
282. See ch. 40B, §§ 20–21. To qualify as affordable housing, it must be affordable to “a household
of one or more persons whose maximum income does not exceed 80% of the area median income.”
760 MASS. CODE REGS. § 56.02 (2020).
283. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40B, § 22 (West 1998).
284. See ch. 40B, § 20.
285. See infra text accompanying note 286.
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Upon the initial permit application, the local board has thirty days to hold a
hearing and then forty days after the hearing to issue a decision.286 Regarding
the comparative success of Chapter 40B, as of 2020, roughly 19% of Massachusetts cities fall within the 10% threshold of low income housing,287 compared to California where only 3% of cities meet their predetermined RHNA
goals.288
While Chapter 40B seems to have found legitimate solutions to get multifamily-housing-reticent regions to build housing on paper, recently scholars
have debated whether CEQA or MEPA (the CEQA-analogous Massachusetts
law) reforms are more effective.289 Critics of CEQA fault its arduous process
and complex solutions, like the RHNA, and argue that Chapter 40B offers a
more streamlined program that simply bullies municipalities into building
housing.290 Meanwhile, critics of Chapter 40B have recently emerged, noting
that the statute still leaves too much control in the hands of local zoning bodies, resulting in a process that remains too long and too ineffective to keep up
with the pace of housing demands.291 Apparently, under the current statute,
local municipalities are still able to “block affordable housing construction
quite easily.”292 These critics of Chapter 40B argue that Massachusetts should
instead model its reform efforts after California and specifically point to
286. See ch. 40B, § 21.
287. See Subsidized Housing Inventory (SHI), MASS.GOV, https://www.mass.gov/service-details/subsidized-housing-inventory-shi (last visited Nov. 6, 2021).
288. Jeff Collins, California Needs More Housing, but 97% of Cities and Counties Are Failing To
Issue Enough RHNA Permits, ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Dec. 10, 2019, 6:37 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2019/12/09/losing-the-rhna-battle-97-of-cities-counties-fail-to-meet-state-housing-goals/. It
is possible that one reason why California struggles to meet its RHNA goals is because, as some cities
say, the goals are simply “unrealistic and unachievable.” Bradley Bermont, Pasadena Reckons with
‘Unachievable’ RHNA Housing Goals After Appeal Rejection, PASADENA STAR-NEWS (Jan. 23, 2021,
6:42 PM), https://www.pasadenastarnews.com/2021/01/20/pasadena-reckons-with-unachievablerhna-housing-goals-after-appeal-rejection/. In fact, when the most recent RHNA numbers were released at least fifty cities appealed the numbers, believing they were too high. See id.
289. See infra notes 290–93 and accompanying text.
290. See generally Carolina K. Reid, Carol Galante & Ashley F. Weinstein-Carnes, Addressing
California’s Housing Shortage: Lessons from Massachusetts Chapter 40B, 25 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS.
& CMTY. DEV. 241 (2017) (arguing that California should model Massachusetts’s Chapter 40B expedition process in order to increase the efficiency of its programs). What this back and forth tells us is
that no state has yet to find the perfect concoction of reform. See id.
291. Forgione, supra note 108, at 216–17 (asserting that Massachusetts’s “status quo policy of [new
housing] incentivization” cannot resolve its current “housing crisis”).
292. Forgione, supra note 108, at 211. It is important to note that even critics of Chapter 40B do
not contend that any current formulation of CEQA and CEQA-related reforms are better than 40B but
are instead pointing to proposed California legislation that has yet to be enacted. See infra text accompanying note 293.
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Senate Bill 50 and Senate Bill 827—both recently failed California legislative
bills.293 Therefore, while Massachusetts provides a small piece of the puzzle
as to what a more objective CEQA reform could look like, both Massachusetts
and California face the same hurdle in pushing local municipalities to allow
affordable housing: the voters.294
2. Lessons from Minnesota—Removing the Public Approval Hurdle
While California and Massachusetts struggle to figure out how to get over
the hurdle of public approval, the capital of Minnesota,295 Minneapolis, has
come up with a plain yet effective solution: remove the public approval hurdle
altogether.296 In terms of state control over local zoning power, Minneapolis
made perhaps the most progressive local zoning decision of any city in decades.297 In January of 2020, Minneapolis became the first city in the United
States to enact a city-wide elimination of single-family zoning on parcels.298
The ordinance established a new minimum allowance for residential zoning
by mandating that the most restrictive residential zoning must still allow for
three-family dwellings.299
In practice, this means that if a developer wants to build a duplex, or a
293. Forgione, supra note 108, at 212–14.
294. See supra Section III.A.1.
295. Two years after California established CEQA, Minnesota enacted its own “little NEPA,” the
Minnesota Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116D (1986). To pair with
MEPA, Minnesota also created a separate act called the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA)
that provides citizens with a right to claim against projects with adverse environmental impacts. See
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B (1986). Together, these two Acts mirror CEQA in most general regards.
See generally Kevin Reuther, MEPA at 36: Perspectives on Minnesota’s Little NEPA, 39 ENV’T L.
REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10663, 10663–66 (2009) (providing a broad overview of MEPA and MERA
and their subsequent amendments).
296. See infra notes 297–99 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that Minneapolis, similar to
most large cities in California, is dealing with its own affordable housing crisis. See Steven P. Katkov
& Jon Schoenwetter, Minneapolis’s Great Experiment, 77 BENCH & BAR MINN. 21, 22 (2020).
297. See Katkov & Schoenwetter, supra note 296, at 22. This portion of the article specifically
addresses how a city like Minneapolis has drastically altered its zoning law on its own. Id. Oregon
was the first state to get rid of single-family zoning within cities of a certain population by creating a
minimum zoning requirement for duplexes. See Christian Britschgi, Oregon Becomes First State To
Ditch Single-Family Zoning, REASON (July 1, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://reason.com/2019/07/01/oregon-becomes-first-state-to-ditch-single-family-zoning/. However, such an effort was already tried in
California and failed. See supra text accompanying notes 125–26.
298. See MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., ORDINANCE NO. 2019-048 (Nov. 16, 2019).
299. See id.
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triplex, where there was once a single-family home, opponents will now be
unable to challenge the development by means of an environmental impact
claim.300 This is because, under the new ordinance, the parcel where the single-family home sits is already zoned for a duplex or triplex.301 Even though
Minneapolis’s new ordinance appears innovative in the seemingly archaic
world of zoning laws, it is not quite as revolutionary as some might claim
since a developer could still face adverse environmental claims for trying to
build anything more than a three-unit development.302 Even though the ordinance is not so drastic as to allow large multifamily structures to suddenly
inundate single-family neighborhoods, Minneapolis deserves credit for being
the first city to take this sort of step in the right direction.303
How was Minneapolis able to pass such a landmark legislation when so
many other cities and states—California included—have failed?304 As it turns
out, the secret lies in a statutory exemption provided for comprehensive plans
(including zoning changes) adopted by the city.305 Every ten years, cities in
Minnesota “are required to review and amend their comprehensive plans,” and
the resulting plans are then “exempt from environmental review under
MEPA.”306 Minneapolis took advantage of this mandated planning requirement by identifying and removing developmental barriers that were
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See Erick Trickey, How Minneapolis Freed Itself from the Stranglehold of Single-Family
Homes, POLITICO MAG. (July 11, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/07/11/housing-crisis-single-family-homes-policy-227265. Even though they are catchy, news headlines stating
that Minneapolis “Freed Itself from the Stranglehold of Single-Family Homes” perhaps exaggerate
the ordinance’s net impact. See, e.g., id.; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Minneapolis Saw that NIMBYism
Has Victims, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/10/howminneapolis-defeated-nimbyism/600601/.
303. See, e.g., Christian Britschgi, Minnesota Is Latest State To Consider Ban on Single-Family
Zoning, REASON (Mar. 11, 2020, 10:15 AM), https://reason.com/2020/03/11/minnesota-is-lateststate-to-consider-ban-on-single-family-zoning/ (discussing Minnesota’s recent consideration to turn
Minneapolis’s city-wide ordinance into a state-wide ordinance). Since Minneapolis passed its ordinance, many other states have pursued similar legislation. Id.; Haisten Willis, As Cities Rethink SingleFamily Zoning, Traditional Ideas of the American Dream are Challenged, WASH. POST (June 27,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/as-cities-rethink-single-family-zoning-traditionalideas-of-the-american-dream-are-challenged/2019/06/25/8312a512-4ca3-11e9-93d064dbcf38ba41_story.html (discussing how Minneapolis has inspired cities like Austin, Texas, and
Berkeley, California, to consider getting rid of single-family zoning).
304. See infra Section IV.A.2.
305. MINN. R. 4410.4600 (2019).
306. State by Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 941 N.W.2d 741, 745 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2020) (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 473.864(2) (West 2006)), rev’d on other grounds, 954 N.W.2d
584 (Minn. 2021). These exemptions are judicially enforced. See id. at 746.
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preventing low- to mid-income housing developments.307 This resulted in
Minneapolis 2040, a comprehensive plan eliminating single-family zoning
and other barriers to density development such as minimum street parking
requirements and minimum lot size.308 Best of all, because of the exemption
provided to comprehensive plans, NIMBYs have faced obstacles in their attempts to bring environmental causes of action against the plan.309
Unfortunately, the current state of California’s laws prevents any city or
county from being able to directly apply the same strategy as Minneapolis.310
Primarily due to judicial interpretation, the loophole allowing Minneapolis to
take such a radical zoning step is nonexistent in California.311 Unlike MEPA,
which statutorily exempts a municipality’s ten-year comprehensive plan from
environmental review, California’s legislature has not created a similar exemption, and its judiciary has repeatedly held that no similar exemption applies.312 Indeed, the California Supreme Court has stated that “the enactment
or amendment of a general plan is subject to environmental review under
CEQA.”313 Even though the CEQA statute includes no provision refusing
such an exemption, the CEQA Guidelines do, and these guidelines are deeply
rooted in numerous judicial opinions.314 The justification for such precedent
comes from the belief that general plans altering a region’s zoning “have a
potential for resulting in ultimate physical changes in the environment,” and
CEQA must be interpreted to “afford the fullest possible protection to the

307. See Sarah J. Adams-Schoen, Dismantling Segregationist Land Use Controls, 43 ZONING &
PLAN. L. REP. 1, 11–13 (2020).
308. See id. at 11.
309. But see Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 584 (Minn. 2021)
(finding that the plaintiff’s challenge to a comprehensive plan could proceed under MERA).
310. See infra notes 312–15 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 312–14 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 314–15 and accompanying text.
313. Muzzy Ranch Co. v. Solano Cnty. Airport Land Use Comm’n, 160 P.3d 116, 124 (Cal. 2007)
(citing Devita v. Cnty. of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1039 (Cal. 1995); Black Prop. Owners Ass’n v. City
of Berkeley, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 312 (Dist. Ct. App. 1994); City of Santa Ana v. City of Garden
Grove, 160 Cal. Rptr. 907, 913 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979)). In California, the “general plan” is the term
used for what Minnesota calls the “comprehensive plan.” See Muzzy Ranch Co., 160 P.3d at 124
(describing the city’s general plan).
314. See Devita, 889 P.2d at 1039; see also Sierra Club v. San Joaquin Loc. Agency Formation Co.,
981 P.2d 543, 552 (Cal. 1999) (“It is, of course, a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided
differently by the current justices.”).
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environment.”315
Thus, given the court’s aforementioned interpretations and the California
legislature’s recent failures, if California wishes to allow any of its regions to
follow in Minneapolis’s footsteps, there is still one available alternative
through the legislature.316 The state legislature could pass a bill mirroring
Minnesota Statute Section 473.864(2) to provide a statutory exemption for
certain types of locally adopted general plans.317 This would free cities to
follow Minneapolis’s footsteps and get rid of single family zoning altogether.318 Technically, this would just be a more subversive and expansive
form of the duplex zoning bill that failed in 2020: Senate Bill 1120.319 However, this indirect strategy of passing legislation to allow local municipalities
to freely alter their general plan without the fear of CEQA complaints so that
they could then pass a sweeping zoning change similar to Minneapolis could
be just the type of creative strategy required for effective CEQA reform.320
3. Lessons from New York—Sometimes It Pays To Be a Follower.
New York did not adopt its CEQA equivalent until 1976, six years after
CEQA’s enaction.321 This delay meant New York had the privilege of learning from California’s successes and missteps in its initial statutory enactments, which resulted in two stark differences between CEQA and New
York’s State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA).322 First, New
York does not allow individuals to file anonymous SEQRA law suits.323 It is

315. City of Santa Ana, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 910, 913.
316. See infra notes 317–20.
317. See Smart Growth Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis, 954 N.W.2d 584, 591–92 (Minn. 2021)
(explaining Minnesota’s statutory exemption).
318. See MINN. ORDINANCE NO. 2019-048 (Nov. 16, 2019); supra note 317 and accompanying text.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 207–08.
320. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text (discussing the failures of Senate Bill 1120).
321. See Nicholas A. Robinson, SEQRA’s Siblings: Precedents from Little NEPA’s in the Sister
States, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1155, 1160 (1982).
322. See id. (“When [SEQRA was enacted], . . . New York was able to benefit from the experiences
of California and twelve other states with little NEPA[]s.”); infra notes 323, 327 and accompanying
text.
323. Cf. Hernandez, supra note 31, at 58–60 (discussing the problems that anonymity brings to
CEQA suits). A brief comparison of the complaining parties listed in major CEQA cases and the
names listed in major SEQRA cases reveals the facial impact of this anonymity. Compare Save the
Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005 (Cal. 2011), and Friends of the Eel River
v. N. Coast R.R. Auth., 399 P.3d 37 (Cal. 2017), and Friends of Mammoth v. Bd. of Supervisors, 502
P.2d 1049 (Cal. 1972), with Bridon Realty Co. v. Town Bd. of Clarkson, 672 N.Y.S.2d 887 (App. Div.
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possible that New York simply believed that SEQRA-filer anonymity was a
redundant protection since SEQRA filers were already protected from any retaliatory lawsuits from angry developers through New York’s anti-SLAPP
statute.324 Generally, states enact anti-SLAPP statutes in order to “discourage
claims against persons who exercise their ‘right of petition under the [C]onstitution of the United States or of the Commonwealth.’”325 In practice, New
York’s anti-SLAPP statute has served as a strong protection for complainants
because most retaliatory “suits of this sort have been dismissed.”326 Second,
SEQRA carries stricter standing requirements than CEQA does.327 To have
standing under SEQRA, “the petitioner must make a showing that the action
complained of will have a harmful effect on it or that it has suffered an injury
in fact and that the interest asserted is arguably within the zone of interest
protected by the SEQRA.”328
Similar to New York, California also has a fairly broad sweeping antiSLAPP statute that provides sufficient protection to CEQA claimants.329
Therefore, if one of the primary justifications for CEQA’s filer anonymity is
to protect plaintiffs from developer retaliation suits, then legislators must recognize that the anonymity protection is redundant because such retaliation is
already prevented by the state’s anti-SLAPP protections.330 Under the current
anti-SLAPP statute, CEQA complainants are already “entitled to treble damages if improperly targeted by a [retaliatory] lawsuit.”331 Thus, California
legislators can remove the shield of anonymity from CEQA suits without any
legitimate fear of adversely impacting meritorious CEQA claimants.332
Regarding SEQRA’s standing threshold, unlike New York, not only does

1998); Collier Realty LLC v. Bloomberg, 877 N.Y.S.2d 866 (2009), and Long Island Contractors’
Ass’n v. Town of Riverhead, 793 N.Y.S.2d 494 (App. Div. 2005).
324. See Michael B. Gerrard, Judicial Review Under SEQRA: A Statistical Study, 65 ALB. L. REV.
365, 378 (2001) (citing N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 76-a (McKinney 2001)).
325. 37 JOSEPH R. NOLAN & LAURIE J. SARTORIO, MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES § 6.6 (3d
ed. 2020).
326. See Gerrard, supra note 324.
327. See infra note 328 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 115–22 and accompanying
text (discussing California’s CEQA standing requirements in detail).
328. 1 ALEXA ASHWORTH ET AL., 24B CARMODY-WAIT 2D NEW YORK PRACTICE WITH FORMS
§ 145:1377 (2021).
329. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2015).
330. Id.
331. Hernandez, supra note 31, at 43.
332. See supra notes 329–31 and accompanying text.
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CEQA’s lower standing threshold make it easier for NIMBYs or economically interested parties to file frivolous CEQA suits,333 but it also allows interested parties to file CEQA suits simply because they do not like the government’s environmental action.334 These increased complaints prevent
California from ever effectively streamlining the CEQA process because the
courts’ dockets are too preoccupied with cases brought by anonymous individuals with weak standing.335
So far, the California legislature has never expressed interest in amending
CEQA’s statute to raise the threshold for standing requirements.336 However,
state courts have left the door open to restrict public interest standing, and the
courts may prove to be the best avenue through which to address CEQA’s
standing issues.337 For example, this door to denying public interest standing
claims was left open in Save the Plastic Bag Coalition v. City of Manhattan
Beach, where the court indicated that the “public interest [standing] exception
‘may be outweighed in a proper case by competing considerations of a more
urgent nature.’”338 Despite this precedent, few courts have chosen to use their
authority to deny public interest standing to even the most self-interested petitioners.339 Instead, courts have only exercised the precedent from Save the
Plastic Bag Coalition to expand and strengthen public interest standing and
have not used the precedent to reject standing due to the weight of any competing considerations.340 In practice, this means that for the state court to restrict public interest standing so it can more closely mirror the standing requirements of SEQRA, California courts must finally exercise a decade-old

333. See generally LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CEQA CASE REPORT 1–145 (2018),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/ceqa-case-report-understanding-judicial-landscape-for-development (analyzing the fifty-seven CEQA cases brought before California courts in 2018).
334. See, e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254 P.3d 1005, 1008 (Cal.
2011) (holding that plastic bag manufacturers did have public interest standing to challenge a city’s
plastic bag ban ordinance, even though such an action was intended as an environmental protection).
335. See supra notes 115–22 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 333–35 and accompanying text (explaining the possible benefits of raising the
minimum threshold to bring a CEQA claim).
337. See infra note 338 and accompanying text.
338. 254 P.3d at 1013 (quoting Green v. Obledo, 624 P.2d 256, 267 (Cal. 1981)); see also Rialto
Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 12, 24 (Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(“[N]o party may proceed with a mandamus petition ‘as a matter of right’ under the public interest
exception.” (quoting Save the Plastic Bag Coal., 254 P.3d at 1013)).
339. See Diaz, supra note 117, at 630 (discussing courts’ reluctance to deny petitioners’ claims of
public interest standing).
340. See supra note 338 and accompanying text; see Diaz, supra note 117, at 630.
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exception to public interest standing.341
The final unique way in which New York navigates SEQRA compared to
CEQA is that it empowers the state’s largest city, New York City, to create its
own codified process for SEQRA implementation called the City Environmental Quality Review (CEQR).342 New York State explicitly allows for municipalities to create such agency procedures in order to clarify and streamline
their region’s SEQRA process, so long as these measures are “no less protective of environmental values, public participation, and agency and judicial review than the [mandated] procedures.”343 CEQR allows New York to provide
guidance and requirements that are necessary due to “the special circumstances of New York City.”344 The main differences that CEQR provides from
SEQRA are in “provid[ing] guidance on selection of a lead agency, add[ing]
scoping requirements, and promot[ing] the use of the City’s CEQR Technical
Manual in conducting environmental reviews.”345
In California, given that a majority of the CEQA cases are brought against
projects in California’s urban centers such as Los Angeles and San Francisco,
California’s legislature should consider implementing something similar to
New York Environmental Conservation Law § 8-0113.346 Similar to New
York, California’s urban centers each have their own city-specific challenges,
and even though city-specific implementation plans for CEQA would not
make it any harder or easier for NIMBYs to bring frivolous CEQA claims,
they could provide cities with more streamlined procedures that work best for
that city.347 After all, given the vast differences between some of California’s
largest and smallest cities, it is only appropriate that individual cities address
CEQA claims in the manner best suited for them.348
341. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
342. N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES tit. 62, § 5 (2021).
343. N.Y. ENV’T CONSERV. LAW § 8-0113 (McKinney 2014). According to the statute, any city in
New York could create its own codified city-specific SEQRA implementation rules; however, New
York City is the only city to have done so thus far. See RULES, tit. 62, § 5.
344. CEQR
FAQs–General,
NYC
MAYOR’S
OFF.
ENV’T
COORDINATION,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/oec/environmental-quality-review/ceqr-faqs-general.page (last visited
Nov. 6, 2021).
345. See id.
346. See ENV’T CONSERV. § 8-0113; RULES, tit. 62, § 5.
347. See N.Y.C., N.Y., RULES tit. 62, § 5–01 (2021) (allowing New York City to create its own
city-specific SEQRA procedures).
348. See supra notes 346–47 and accompanying text. California arguably has more densely populated cities than any state in the United States. See CDC, 500 LARGEST CITIES, BY STATE AND
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Overall, no one state currently provides California with a “one size fits
all” solution for CEQA reform; however, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New
York do provide a piece of the puzzle for CEQA reform.349 Massachusetts,
through its objective expedition process of Chapter 40B, provides a means for
California to set clearer objective goals for housing and a means to expedite
enforcement.350 Minnesota provides a creative strategy that, if adopted in California, could empower cities to rid themselves of single-family zoning.351
And New York provides an example of what it could look like for California
to get rid of anonymous CEQA suits and to allow cities to craft their own cityspecific CEQA rules.352
B. A Change in Perspective.
“Preservation of our [e]nvironment is not a liberal or conservative
challenge; it’s common sense.”
–President Ronald Reagan (former Governor of California)353
Considering California’s struggle to find effective CEQA reform, perhaps
a perspective shift is required.354 Currently, most of the CEQA reform efforts
focus almost solely on providing CEQA reform to low- to mid-income housing developments,355 and only a few focus specifically on multifamily housing.356 However, shifting the focus from solely low- to mid-income housing
could more quickly create a positive impact in California’s housing

POPULATION 1–13 (2010), https://www.cdc.gov/places/about/500-cities-2016-2019/pdfs/500-citiesby-state.pdf. According to the 2010 United States Census, of the nation’s 500 most populous cities,
California alone is home to nearly one quarter of them. See id. at 1–4.
349. See supra Section IV.A.
350. See supra Section IV.A.1.
351. See supra Section IV.A.2.
352. See supra Section IV.A.3.
353. Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1984).
354. See infra note 357 and accompanying text (describing the necessary perspective shift).
355. See, e.g., A.B. 2345, 2019–2020 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (expanding California’s density bonus
provisions); S.B. 35, 2017–2018 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (stating that communities that fail to approve
sufficient housing for the poor automatically forfeit the privilege to deny qualifying infill projects until
they rectify such a deficit); A.B. 73, 2017–2018 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (creating incentivized program
for housing and more concerned with preserving affordable housing than creating more housing).
356. See, e.g., A.B. 725, 2019–2020 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (providing large unzoning opportunities
for middle-income apartments); S.B. 1085, 2019–2020 Gen. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (expanding Density
Bonus Law to include qualifying moderate-income rental projects and student housing projects).
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shortage.357 This indirect approach to increasing stock for affordable housing
could be much more appealing for developers and NIMBYs alike.358 Thus
far, no CEQA-specific reform efforts have applied in a blanket manner to all
forms of multifamily housing, but sufficient economic research shows that the
old maxim is indeed true that all housing is good housing.359
This radical perspective shift might seem bold; however, it is supported
by multiple recent economic studies measuring the effect that an increase in
housing stock has on nearby existing housing.360 First, in 2016, a report from
the White House showed that “[h]ousing regulation that allows [for] supply
to respond elastically to demand helps cities protect homeowners and home
values.”361 Thus, building more units of any kind should theoretically drive
down the price of all housing units in the aggregate.362 A second report shows
that regardless of whether the new housing is high or low end, “for every 10%
increase in the housing stock within a 500-foot buffer, residential rents decrease by 1%.”363 The report further showed that the rent reduction does not
occur until after the new housing is fully completed and move-in ready.364
Third, a 2019 study showed that generally, “new buildings decrease nearby
rents by 4.9 percent” for buildings that are within a 250-meter radius of the
new development.365 Given that the rent prices are shown to drop in the buildings surrounding the new development, it makes sense that the study also
showed that new buildings “increase in-migration from low-income areas”
into the newly developed area.366 Together, these studies show that, in the
357. See infra notes 361–68 and accompanying text.
358. See infra notes 369–72 and accompanying text.
359. See infra notes 361, 363–65 and accompanying text.
360. See infra notes 361–65 and accompanying text.
361. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 145, at 3.
362. See id.
363. XIAODI LI, DO NEW HOUSING UNITS IN YOUR BACKYARD RAISE YOUR RENTS? 2 (2019),
https://blocksandlots.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Do-New-Housing-Units-in-Your-BackyardRaise-Your-Rents-Xiaodi-Li.pdf. This same study also found that “[r]esidential property sales prices
. . . decrease when new high-rises within 500 feet are completed.” Id.
364. Id. (stating that “rent reduction is caused by the completion of new high-rises, rather than [by]
their approval”).
365. Brian J. Asquith, Evan Mast & Davin Reed, Supply Shock Versus Demand Shock: The Local
Effects of New Housing in Low-Income Areas 16 (W.E. Upjohn Inst. for Emp. Rsch., Working Paper
No. 19-316, 2019), https://research.upjohn.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1334&context=up_workingpapers.
366. Id. at 1. Considering that NIMBYs often complain that new developments will increase congestion and bring outsiders into their community, this study did affirm that new development often
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short-term, the addition of high-end housing is likely to drive down the rents
in nearby apartments, whether they are high or low end.367 Furthermore,
“[o]ver the long[] run, increases in supply at the medium or higher end of the
market should also increase supply in lower priced markets as older units that
are now less valuable work their way down to lower priced sub-markets.”368
It seems clear that streamlining CEQA approval for all forms of multifamily housing makes sense on paper, but it is also worth noting that this strategy would likely be easier to pass into legislation than some of the other recently failed reform efforts.369 One reason this strategy is practical is because
higher end housing is much more attractive to real estate developers given its
higher profit margins.370 These increased margins mean that even if legislators find themselves unable to pass a CEQA exemption without including a
prevailing wage requirement, this is less likely to have a negative impact.371
Another reason this strategy deserves optimism is because its bill passage is
less likely to face NIMBY opposition than a bill specifically looking to increase low- to mid-income housing.372
Lastly, through the recent passage of the Housing Crisis Act of 2019, California legislators have shown that perhaps this perspective shift has already
gained momentum; it is just not broad enough yet in its reach.373 The Act
recently amended existing legislation to prevent local governments from creating additional ordinances, policies, or standards that would delay a housing
development project that already has preliminary approval.374 It also
means new people. See discussion supra Section II.D.3.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 361–66. There is a group that opposes the aforementioned
form of thinking, commonly referred to as “supply skeptics,” who argue that if you build more there
will just be more outsiders who then move into your area. See BEEN ET AL., supra note 110, at 6.
368. BEEN ET AL., supra note 110, at 6.
369. See infra notes 370–72 and accompanying text.
370. See The Cost of Affordable Housing, supra note 136 (discussing a developer’s profit margins
for building new multifamily housing).
371. See supra notes 232–35 and accompanying text (discussing the impact that mandated prevailing wages have on a development’s profit margins).
372. See discussion supra Section II.D.3. NIMBY opposition could arise from homeowners and
landlords concerned that the overall value of their property might decrease. See LI, supra note 363, at
30 (discussing how, after the completion of a multifamily structure, “[t]he sales prices gradually decline right after nearby”).
373. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65589.5 (West 2020).
374. See GOV’T § 65589.5(o)(1)–(2); see 7 KARL E. GEIER & SEAN R. MARCINIAK, MILLER &
STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 21.13 (4th ed. 2021) (providing a more in-depth discussion of the
recent changes to Section 65905.5). The reason that the Housing Crisis Act of 2019 is not included in
Part III.A’s discussion on the current state of the law is because the Act explicitly does not apply to
CEQA. See infra text accompanying notes 379–81.
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expedited the public agency approval process by limiting the number of public
hearings that could be held relating to a development project to five.375 While
such restrictions were previously in place for large affordable multifamily
projects, the 2019 amendments expanded the statute’s reach to all “housing
development project[s].”376 Likely part of the reason why legislators expanded the impact of the statute was because, as stated in the bill itself: “California has a housing supply and affordability crisis of historic proportions”
and requires “statutes intended to significantly increase the approval, development, and affordability of housing for all income levels.”377
Unfortunately, the protections provided by The Housing Crisis Act of
2019 explicitly do not apply to CEQA.378 The statute states that its provisions
do not lessen the burdens imposed by CEQA.379 The Act only seems to prevent municipalities from creating new roadblocks for housing that have preliminary approval and does not restrict a citizen’s ability to bring a CEQA
claim based on potential environmental impacts—frivolous or not.380 But the
Housing Crisis Act shows that the state legislators do see the need to remove
developmental hurdles for all forms of housing and are taking active steps to
do so; however, the act fails thus far to address a major developmental roadblock: CEQA.381 Given the economic and legislative feasibility of increasing
all levels of housing stock in California, subsequent CEQA reforms must apply to all forms of housing similar to the Housing Crisis Act.382

375. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65905.5(a) (West 2020) (“[I]f a proposed housing development project complies with the applicable, objective general plan and zoning standards in effect at the time an
application is deemed complete, after the application is deemed complete, a city, county, or city and
county shall not conduct more than five hearings pursuant to Section 65905, or any other law, ordinance, or regulation requiring a public hearing in connection with the approval of that housing development project.”).
376. GOV’T § 65589.5(h)(2)(A)–(C).
377. GOV’T § 65589.5(a)(2) (emphasis added).
378. See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
379. GOV’T § 65589.5(e); see Schellinger Bros. v. City of Sebastapol, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 396,
405 (Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (stating that Government Code Section 65589.5 “cannot be used to halt the
decision-making process specified by CEQA that is still on-going” since “there is no indication the
[l]egislature meant to modify or accelerate CEQA’s procedures”).
380. See GOV’T § 65589.5(e); GOV’T § 65589.5(o).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 377–79.
382. See supra Section IV.B.
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V. CONCLUSION
When California enacted CEQA over fifty years ago, the law was the first
of its kind, and California was a pioneer on the environmental preservation
stage.383 At its inception, CEQA was undoubtably altruistic: seeking to empower citizens to partake in policing and ensuring the state’s environmental
quality for future generations.384 Unfortunately, CEQA has not aged well, as
the wrong people have discovered the right ways to make CEQA serve their
own interests—interests that demote the environment to a secondary concern.385 These suspect uses of CEQA have only exacerbated California’s
housing crisis and served as a subversive tool to keep minorities out of
wealthy, affluent neighborhoods.386
Even in its current state, however, CEQA is not a lost cause.387 With the
correct legislative and judicial reforms, CEQA can actually work alongside
efforts to increase California’s housing stock and get back to one of its original
purposes: “providing a decent home and satisfying living environment for
every Californian.”388 First, California’s current means of telling cities how
much housing they must build—the Regional Housing Needs Allocation
tool—is complex and results in what many cities consider unrealistic goals.389
By looking at Massachusetts’s successes with Chapter 40B, California should
implement a more objective form of measurement and a streamlined form of
enforcement like the Housing Appeals Commission.390 Second, California
should pass legislation that exempts a city’s general plan amendments from
CEQA review, which would then allow cities to amend their general plans
and end single-family zoning as Minnesota has done.391 Third, similar to New
York, California should not allow anonymous CEQA lawsuits and should instead rely on its anti-SLAPP laws to protects CEQA filers.392 Also similar to
383. See supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
384. See supra text accompanying notes 54–60.
385. See discussion supra Section II.D.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29 (discussing how some CEQA suits can slow the
development of housing); supra notes 144–49 and accompanying text (discussing the subversive racially motivated CEQA uses).
387. See infra text accompanying notes 388–96.
388. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000 (West 2021); see also supra Parts III, IV (discussing potential
CEQA reform efforts).
389. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
390. See supra Section IV.A.1.
391. See supra Section IV.A.2.
392. See supra Section IV.A.3.

467

[Vol. 49: 413, 2022]

How California’s Premier Environmental Law
Has Worsened the State’s Housing Crisis
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

New York, California should increase its standing requirement to file a CEQA
claim by exercising a narrow judicial exception from Save the Plastic Bag
Coalition v. City of Manhattan Beach and allow major California cities to
adopt their own procedural codes for dealing with CEQA.393 Lastly, California must expand future reforms to all forms of housing and not just low- to
mid-income housing.394 Overall, a successful course correction will not result
from any single solution but instead will come from a collage of smaller piecemeal efforts that originate from past legislative efforts, other states’ reforms,
and untried innovative solutions.395 Together, these reforms will paint a
brighter future for California’s environment and its people.396
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